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A decade – more or less – past the publication of the edited collection Neoliberal Environments 
and Neil Smith’s ‘Nature as an Accumulation Strategy’, this forum aims to revisit and reflect on 
neoliberal natures, both out in the world and in the scholarly literature. In this time, there have 
been a number of advances in our conceptual apparatus for interpreting capital’s productions of 
nature, ranging from financialization to vital materialism to world ecology. Further, the world has 
not stood still in the intervening decade. Various schemes for neoliberalizing nature have come 
and gone while others have launched, and the financial crisis led to widespread and often 
retrenched austerity even as extractivism showed no sign of abating. In light of these 
developments, we convened this forum to ask: what are the failures and accomplishments of 
neoliberal natures? Our use of the world accomplishments is not normative. We have gathered 
insights to reflect on the material-semiotic effects of neoliberal hegemony in the environmental 
register, and how critical scholars interpret, and even intervene in, those effects. The forum begins 
with an introduction that discusses what we see as the ‘ins and outs’ of the neoliberal nature’s 
literature. That is, we ask what types of natures the authors in the literature have grappled with 
and what kinds of questions have been asked those arrangements. Reflecting on trends in the 
neoliberalization of nature and a bibliometric analysis of papers in the literature, we argue that 
while accomplishing much, there remain critical gaps in our explanatory frameworks driven by 
geography’s troubling lack of ethnic and gender diversity.  
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A decade – more or less – past the publication of the edited collection Neoliberal 
Environments (Heynen et al., 2007a) and Smith’s (2007) ‘Nature as an Accumulation 
Strategy’, this forum aims to revisit and reflect on neoliberal natures, both out in the 
world and in the scholarly literature. In this time, there have been a number of advances 
in our conceptual apparatus for interpreting capital’s productions of nature, ranging from 
financialization to vital materialism to world ecology. Further, the world has not stood still 
in the intervening decade. Various schemes for neoliberalizing nature have come and gone 
while others have launched, and the financial crisis led to widespread and often retrenched 
austerity even as extractivism showed no sign of abating. 
In light of these developments, we convened this forum to ask: what are the failures and 
accomplishments of neoliberal natures? Our use of the world accomplishments is not 
normative. Rather, we have gathered insights to reflect on the material–semiotic effects of 
neoliberal hegemony in the environmental register, and how we (namely, geographers and 
anthropologists) interpret, and even intervene in, those effects. We, and the contributors to 
this forum, recognize that definitions of neoliberalism can vary widely and the very utility of 
the concept is disputed (Rodgers, 2018).1 2 Even those who accept and employ the concept 
(including us) are quick to highlight its variegation, contradictions, and incompleteness (e.g. 
Asiyanbi, this issue; Heynen et al., 2007b, Mann, 2013). Nonetheless, we continue to find the 
concept sufficiently precise to add analytical purchase, along both political economic (e.g. 
Harvey, 2005) and the more-than-economic axes (e.g. Brown, 2015; Larner, 2007). 
Several of the contributors to this forum have been key thinkers in this field of study. 
Mansfield’s (2004, 2007) work on tradeable fisheries permits, Lave’s (2012a, 2012b, 2012c) 
research on the intersection of environmental science and neoliberalism, Robertson’s (2004, 
2006, 2012) studies on wetland banking policy and, Simson’s (2010, Simon et al., 2012) 
research at the nexus of CO2 emissions, international development and technological fixes 
have all been influential over the last decade. Meanwhile, other contributors represent a new 
generation of scholars taking on the commodification, marketization and financialization of 
‘ecosystems services’ and the various schemes meant to simultaneously fix uneven 
development, environmental problems and accumulation crises. This includes Kay’s (2016, 
2018) research on conservation easements in the US, as well as Asiyanbi (2016, 2018) and 
Osborne’s (2011, 2015) work in different settings and with different theoretical approaches 
on REDD. 
This introduction is necessarily partial, as is the forum as a whole. In some ways, this is a 
testament to the growth and diversity of the neoliberal nature’s literature (see Figure 1). The 
literature has expanded in a variety of important directions; for example, the dialog between 
urban political ecology and neoliberal natures has been particularly fruitful (see Heynen, 
2014) although it is underexplored in this forum. In her 2010 overview of the literature, 
Karen Bakker noticed that most of the nature receiving attention in the literature were 
‘conventional’ resources, whereas ‘other types of socio-natures – such as human bodies, 
genetically modified organisms, ecosystem ‘services’ of various kinds – receive scant 
attention’ (p. 3). In the intervening decade, geographers took on those gaps with gusto, 
particularly regarding ecosystem services (e.g. Dempsey and Robertson, 2012; Fletcher and 
Breitling, 2012; Kolinjivadi et al., 2017; McAfee and Shapiro, 2010; Sullivan, 2013) but also in 
relation to the biological (e.g. Collard, 2014; Guthman, 2011; Labban, 2014; Mansfield, 2012). 
In this introduction, we identify some contemporary gaps in the literature, highlighting 
emerging (or perhaps festering) problems to which we might usefully direct our attention. 
The forum leans towards scholarship on market governance of environmental concerns. 
This is partially a result of the substantive areas in which we engage and partially reflects the 
directions in which the literature has grown; but also, we think, it reflects changes in 
capitalism’s world ecology over the last decade. We begin this introduction by parsing 
some trends in the world ‘out there’ to set the context, then return to the literature. 
To aid in our analysis of the scholarly work, we compiled a data set of 1035 papers from 
geography and anthropology using keyword searches in Web of Science (see Note 2 
describing our method). Using this data set, we are able to query the frequency of terms 
in titles, keywords and abstracts, as well as identify the most cited authors and papers in the 
literature. Through our data set, we show how the neoliberal nature’s literature – like 
geography as a whole – remains dominated by White men, particularly in terms of the 
authors the field has drawn on most frequently. We discuss these findings in the second 
and third section of this essay, as well as gesturing to some directions for the literature as a 
whole. We are particularly interested in further explorations of how key constituent 
processes of neoliberalization are co-produced through longstanding more-than-economic 
practices and ideologies, particularly raced and gendered otherings on which manifestations 
of late liberal capitalism are predicated and through which neoliberalism, writ large, 
continues to be produced. 
 
The neoliberal world out there 
The last(ish) decade of neoliberal natures is bookended by the start of the financial crisis and 
the election of Donald Trump, including the swell and ebb of Latin America’s ‘pink tide’, 
China’s ever-growing economic and political power, the Occupy movement, the Arab 
Spring, the global commodities boom, the acceleration of biodiversity loss and soaring 
atmospheric CO2 concentrations, to name but a few consequential events. Thinking 
through this decade, we can identify several distinct but connected trends in 
neoliberalization broadly, and specifically regarding its ecological manifestations. Ours is 
but one of a multitude of schema that have been used to identify the constituent pieces of the 
neoliberalization of nature (e.g. Bakker, 2010; Castree, 2008b; Heynen et al., 2007b). We do 
not aim for comprehensiveness; rather, we suggest these as important contextual trends for 
the forum: first, the move from government to governance; second, financialization and new 
environmental markets; and third, the generalization and ossification of austerity, and 
especially austerity’s relationship to continuing or intensified extractivism. 
 
From Copenhagen to disclosure: Preferring governance to government 
The lack of action on climate change in this decade is one of the most illustrative and deeply 
troubling trends. In the past decade, we have witnessed a series of failed, or close to failed 
UNFCCC negotiations – with the most spectacular being COP 15 in Copenhagen, which 
crushed many climate activists’ hopes. Along with disappointing supranational 
agreements, in this decade, we decisively moved from climate change models to climate 
change impacts. Heat waves (Christidis et al., 2015), forest fires (Abatzoglou and 
Williams, 2016), aquatic mass die-offs (Hughes et al., 2017): all of it is happening. The 
decade saw a slew of socio-natural catastrophes, particularly super storms that impact the 
poor and racialized more than anyone else, from Houston to the Philippines, which 
experienced 5 of its 10 most deadly typhoons since 2006. Such superstorms can now, at 
least in part, be attributed to anthropogenic GHG emissions (Harvey, 2018). [AQ4] One of 
the bright spots in the last decade has been the concerted effort to mainstream climate 
change as a moral, ethical and/or justice issue, demonstrated perhaps best by the 
divestment movement’s tagline: if it is wrong to wreck the climate, it is wrong to profit 
from it. 
But even if climate change is increasingly understood in term of injustices along raced and 
classed lines, the outrageous, take-your-breath-away fact is that world oil production 
between 2006 and 2016 increased by 11%, and even more tellingly, world proven oil 
reserves grew by a third over the same time period (BP, 2017). Governments have been 
loath to impose meaningful restrictions on production, despite knowing that the vast 
majority of this newly exploitable oil must be kept in the ground. Instead, most states 
have preferred to dabble with regulations on the consumption side through mechanisms 
like automobile fuel efficiency standards, while trusting capital markets to regulate 
hydrocarbon producers through stock valuation. These valuations, according to 
(neo)liberal orthodoxy, should govern future capacities to extract those fuels, but stable 
share prices suggest capital markets foresee no impending slowdown in extraction. 
As Christophers (2017) demonstrates, this is emblematic of neoliberal governance 
strategies that rely on data disclosure and rational financial actors to achieve desired 
outcomes; the same logic that defines financial (self)regulation drives hydrocarbon 
(self)regulation. When it comes to the huge GHG emissions reductions that are necessary, 
such strategies have yet to deliver, a point made over and over by critics of mechanisms 
ranging from disclosure to emissions markets (Carton, 2014; Kama, 2014; Klein, 2015). 
Zombie climate neoliberalism lurches along, with little sign of the necessary braincrushing 
blow to the head (Lane and Stefan, 2014). The gap between an emphasis on 
disclosure of climate risks in capital markets and the felt effects of climate change on the 
bodies of poor people of color is appalling. 
In many ways, the decade of inaction reflects the sine qua non of neoliberal natures – the 
shift from government to governance, or the re-placing of critical regulatory functions from 
the state to non/quasi-state actors, driven by policy failures (a la Copenhagen) and also by 
ideologies that privilege the efficiency and rationality of markets often coupled with a 
mistrust or outright disdain for direct state regulations. Yet, the deadlock in the 
governmental sphere is also yielding innovations through the typical power structures of 
the state, namely the courts. There are a spate of climate justice-like cases that look to make 
fossil fuel firms and governments accountable for knowingly causing harm from New York 
to India,3 reflecting that discursive shift to understanding climate change in the terms of 
uneven costs and benefits that can be tried in court. However, such cases flow against the 
grain, as governance strategies for actual mitigation of environmental issues tend not only 
toward self-regulation, but also by actively facilitating new financial incursions into nonhuman 
natures. 
 
Environmental markets to financialization: Failing forward 
The phrase ‘financialization of nature’ hardly appeared before 2008, but is now difficult to 
avoid in the literature. However, questions remain over what actually constitutes 
financialization (Christophers, 2015), and perhaps more importantly, what bits of nonhuman 
nature are (and are not!) being enrolled into financial markets in ways that 
substantially produce new natures. We wholeheartedly agree with authors who are 
dubious about the precision of the term financialization; indeed, financialization is, in a 
sense the new neoliberalism, sometimes acting as a catch-all concept. However, much like 
neoliberalism, we find financialization has something to contribute if we are seeking to 
understand the specifics of cases where underlying natures are not only rendered 
marketable, but where financial representations of nature can be speculated upon in a 
way that derivative income streams (rents) themselves become the matter of financial 
management and experimentation. 
In thinking about the failures of neoliberal natures, the literature is rife with accounts of 
schemes that have tried, and failed, to create fungible financial representations of sundry 
non-human natures through what Asiyanbi (2017) summarizes as ‘new environmental 
finance’. Ranging from REDD (see Osborne, this issue) to regulatory carbon markets 
(Felli, 2015) to biodiversity offsetting (Daccache, 2013), attempts to isolate, render 
fungible, price and swap constituent pieces of non-human nature have emphatically failed 
to achieve the scale expected by authors in 2008; the ‘vertical integration of nature into 
capital’ (Smith, 2007: 33) has hit some snags. While tradeable permit systems for GHG 
emissions continue to expand, notably in China, they have not become structurally 
important for the circulation of capital; the total sum of money changing hands in global 
carbon markets was less than a seventh of the market capitalization of ExxonMobile in 2015 
(Dividend Channel, 2015; International Emissions Trading Association, 2016). Lave (this 
issue) discusses the difficulties this ‘failure to launch’ creates in the neoliberal nature’s 
literature – she wonders why critical scholars expended so much energy and ink on such 
marginal market mechanisms. 
While we agree with Lave that following the ‘neo’ can distract researchers, we also know 
that such schemes can have significant localized effects (e.g. dispossession) and more broadly 
can legitimize continued extraction-as-usual (Felli, 2015). Furthermore, many market-based 
schemes seem to further sediment what we might call an international, racialized division of 
labour for climate mitigation, where brown and black bodies are called upon to change their 
lives in the service of (supposed) efficient, low-cost emission reductions. While writers like 
London et al. (2013) have flagged the (continuing) unequal distribution of toxics made 
possible through offsetting in tradeable permit systems, authors more squarely in the 
neoliberal nature’s literature (including ourselves) have rarely engaged with the raced 
logics of market-based environmental policy (although see Baldwin, 2009, 2016), a point 
we return to in the conclusion. 
If the last decade saw the rise and fall of carbon trading desks at major financial firms, the 
financialization of land appears here to stay. As Kay (this issue), Ouma (2016), Fairbairn 
(2014) and others have demonstrated, bankers have gone ‘back to the land’, along with 
institutional investors like university endowments, pensions and sovereign wealth funds. Kay 
(this issue) shows that de/re-regulatory moves and an interest in real assets have led financial 
investors to acquire land as a more flexible and adaptable asset, able to produce value 
through a range of commodities or through asset appreciation depending on prevailing 
conditions, both environmental and economic. Driven by recognition that climate change 
will put significant downward pressure on agricultural yields, the upheaval in commodity 
prices alongside the global financial crisis, and cliche´ observations about land like, ‘they’re 
not making any more of it’, ‘ag space’ is a significantly more mainstream investment class 
than it was a decade ago (Kish and Fairbairn, 2017). While monetary flows are notoriously 
difficult to track down in agricultural investment (Ouma et al., 2018), farmland acquisition 
funds raised around US$500 million in 2009, then grew to US$3.9 billion in 2015 (Meyer, 
2016). This is not to say that the enactment of ‘finance gone farming’ has been smooth 
(Ouma, 2016). Indeed, studies of financial engagement with agriculture have gone farther 
than most in heeding Bracking’s (2012: 285) caution that, ‘if we are to understand the future 
of the economic relationship between capitalism and environment . . . the particular process 
of financialization needs to be embodied rather than merely intoned’. While uneven, 
fractured and incomplete (which might be said of most financial engagements with 
‘nature’, see Ouma et al., 2018), farmland and agro-food system are an expanding front in 
the finance-nature nexus. Further, this expanding confluence is not, and cannot, be a ‘purely’ 
political–economic process, but can be soaked in dispossession and violence depending on 
the context: the largest plurality of environmental activists murdered in 2017 was people 
trying to prevent the expansion of large-scale agribusiness (Watts, 2018). 
Farmland is far from the only aspect of nature being subjected to new(ish) financial 
practices. For example, the invention and subsequent growth of the green bonds have been 
rather spectacular in dollar figures, but as an instrument the literature is only beginning to 
engage with. Green bonds are being promoted as a straightforward way for investors to 
facilitate lower carbon economies, and they are less reliant on state regulatory 
(re)definitions than other environmental-financial products, like carbon markets. Invented 
in 2007, green bonds are projected to grow to US$250 billion in 2018 (Chestney, 2018), though 
the specter of greenwashing looms over the entire asset class (Milhench, 2017). There is also a 
been a general growth in what is called ‘impact investment’ assets like ‘socially responsible’ 
mutual and private equity funds (Bracking, 2012; Rosenman, 2017). The growth of green 
finance has taken other directions as well, very much into the realm of financial engineering. 
Parametric insurance for smallholders (Johnson, 2013a), pooled disaster risk insurance 
facilities for small island states (Johnson, 2013b), and debt-for-nature swaps have all been 
trailed with varying levels of success in the last decade. Capital is nothing if not relentless, and 
many of these highly engineered interventions operate with the express aim of drawing new 
people, places and socionatures into global financial circuitry, while (ostensibly) attending to 
climate mitigation/adaptation or biodiversity conservation. Once again we are struck by the 
kind of division of labour at play in global environmental policies where responsibility for 
global socio-ecological reproduction is often placed on the most vulnerable. Insofar as 
neoliberal capital is willing to respond climate change, the rich will get carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) while the poor will be ‘gifted’ GHG saving cookstoves (Simon, this issue) or 
offered ‘life raft’ micro-insurance policies for climate adaptation – all financed with partially 
subsidized debt. The constitution of this grim bifurcated response, where capital relies on 
techno-fixes and continuity while the everyone else is urged to become ‘resilient’, is built on 
longstanding inequities and marginalizations of colonial–capitalist expansion (both internal 
and external, Mies, 1986). But these imperatives are also in line with another key component 
of contemporary neoliberalization–austerity, and its twin, extractivism. 
 
Austerity rules and extractivism 
The retrenchment of austerity, indeed, the political visibility of austerity as a concept and 
category has been a defining characteristic of capitalist political economy over the last decade 
(Salzman et al., 2015). While the term suggests across the board belt tightening, austerity is 
redistributive (Mirowski, 2014) usually in an upward fashion, and not usually towards solving 
environmental problems. There was hope that the financial crisis might sound austerity’s 
death knell as calls mounted for a ‘new’ new deal, and from some quarters, a green new 
deal. Appeals for ecologically inflected Keynesian policies continue to resonate (Cohen, 
2017), and there are even indications that the IMF has come to recognize the immiseration 
inflicted by austerity and structural adjustment (Ostry et al., 2016). [AQ5] This belated and 
laughably insufficient mea culpa has not, of course, impeded other Bretton Woods institutions 
from facilitating the integration of parts of Global South into international financial circuitry 
through lending tethered to mechanisms like green bonds and insurance-linked securities for 
disaster relief,4 or financing new environmentally disastrous projects, like ongoing World 
Bank support for thermal power plants (Roasa, 2016). 
The link between austerity and neoliberal natures has long been present in the literature, 
but rarely in the foreground. While a somewhat blunt tool, in querying our data set of 
papers, only 27/846 (3%) of geography papers had austerity in the keywords, title or 
abstract, and only 3/189 in Anthropology (2%). Austerity goes hand-in-hand with green 
market-making and financialization: one hand starves while the other offers win–win–win 
promises. In our joint research on for-profit biodiversity finance, the first justification for 
profit seeking is always: ‘there isn’t enough cash to save nature and the state ain’t gonna 
provide it’. At the same time, perennial, sometimes tax-cut fueled austerity is also central to 
ongoing, in some cases intensifying, resource extractivism facilitated by cash-strapped states 
(Apostolopoulou and Adams, 2015; Castree, 2008a). So environmental regulation through 
neoliberal governance practices is de rigour alongside intensified extraction that can bring 
resource rents to the state (through domains ranging from mining to urban development). 
For example, the janus-face of neoliberal capitalism’s ecological regime makes it possible for 
the UK’s Conservative government to claim to be ‘the greenest in history’ while 
simultaneously overriding a referendum to ban fracking in Lancashire. Elsewhere, the 
apparent contradiction has been dispensed with entirely. As Mansfield writes in this 
forum, the Trump election signals the return of ‘nature as resource’, that unimproved 
nature is bad and the belief that ‘we can use nature without harm – to nature or to 
ourselves’. 
While Trump’s environmental ideology may lay at the extreme end of the spectrum, 
a recent review in Nature highlights erosion in regulation and regulatory budgets 
worldwide. In terms of environmental protection, politicians are using ‘various tactics to 
render legal instruments toothless’ (Chapron et al., 2017: 3) in countries like Canada, 
Sweden, Brazil, India, UK and Greece, demonstrating once again, that short-term goals 
responding to election cycles and market imperatives ‘are often pursued at the expense of 
long-term environmental interests’ (p. 3). This variety of short-termism is a global 
phenomenon, as politicians view restrictions on degradation and fostering growth as a zerosum 
tradeoff, an instinct that has been productively discussed from a range of political and 
analytical positions, from Klein’s (2015) opening chapter of This Changes Everything, to the 
degrowth literature (D’Alisa et al., 2014), to World Ecology’s discussions of capital’s crisis 
tendency of destroying the conditions of reproduction (Moore, 2015). However, like all 
things neoliberal (or geographical for that matter), we need to take some care not to 
portray identicality where it does not, and perhaps cannot, exist. For example, there is a 
vibrant literature on ‘not quite’ neoliberal natures in Latin America (de Freitas et al., 2015) 
that has explored the natures and policies that were produced by ‘pink tide’ governments, 
against the grain of austerity, but often with the same bipolar approach to environmental 
protection and extraction present elsewhere. 
Lockhart (2015) digs deeper into the case of the UK, where biodiversity offsetting was 
adopted as official policy, but failed in implementation because the state was, effectively, too 
ravaged by austerity to create the conditions whereby even neoliberal biodiversity policy 
might be rolled out. A simmering crisis of housing availability and affordability prompted 
less enthusiasm for any form of landscape conservation if it entailed imposing even nominal 
costs on developers. The narrative that a lack of affordable housing in the UK is driven by 
excessive, expensive environmental regulation typically refuses to acknowledge how the 
neoliberalization of housing and the liberalization of consumer finance, two of Thatcher’s 
signature policy initiatives, is the catalyst of the housing crisis (Robertson, 2017). Instead of 
advocating for increased investment of social housing, this genre of explanation embraces 
neoliberalism’s stock response to crises of its own making: solving market failures with 
‘freer’ markets, and blaming ‘restrictive policy’, rather than austerity or liberalization, for 
social and economic problems. 
The results indicate that the austere state is a significant, ever present, barrier to 
‘successful’ neoliberal environmental governance. Austerity, accompanied by devolution 
of economic and environmental regulation to private sector actors, compels the state and 
other actors to find innovative new sources of finance and environmental governance, while 
simultaneously looking for ways to finance their basic services, facilitating extraction and 
degradation. This Janus-faced character of austerity and extraction is one direction we think 
scholars of neoliberal natures could usefully apply their talents, particularly if coupled with 
the already strong financialization literature. That is, following Asiyanbi (this issue), how 
might we more explicitly illustrate both the overarching relationship between neoliberal 
austerity, deregulation, extractivism, and regulatory/financial innovation, as well as 
specific iterations of that relationship operationalized in context-specific arrangements? 
And further, how might these situations be better understood if we were more attuned to 
the raced, classed, gendered and colonial constitution of both foundations and consequences 
of neoliberalization? Attending to these questions may be a useful way of challenging what 
Simon (this issue) calls ‘stealth known unknowns’, or the tacit forms of environmental 
knowledge that are circulated and become the basis for technocratic, rather than 
democratic, management. The need to challenge these kinds of knowledges is urgent. 
Austere conditions may be new for some, but they are long lasting for others: compare 
the outcry over the contaminated water in the White community of Walkerton, Ontario 
(Prudham, 2004), linked to neoliberal austerity and deregulation, and the 40 First Nations 
communities across Canada dealing with drinking water issues for more than a decade, 
including the Neskantaga First Nation in northern Ontario who has not had clean water 
since 1995 (Russell, 2018).  
In this section, we framed some important trends in the neoliberalization of nature over 
the last decade and some ways the literature helps interpret those trends. In the next section, 
we reflect on the dominant analytical foundations of the literature, exploring both what our 
literature has successfully illuminated, but also what our frameworks have potentially 
obscured. We dig into those blind spots to suggest a variety of practices for more robust, 
wide-ranging engagements with the constituent pieces of the neoliberalization of nature. 
These are not simply analytical tweaks, but a recognition that the neoliberalization of the 
university fundamentally impacts our collective ability to query and challenge 
neoliberalization elsewhere. 
Looking inward and forward: Broadening the ‘actually existing’ 
analytical frames of neoliberal natures 
 
A decade ago, Castree (2008a) reflected on the influence of an ‘institutional political 
economy’ approach in this literature, with emphasis ‘on Marx and Polanyi, state theory, 
regulation theory and economic sociology’ (p. 133). Political economy remains influential in 
the neoliberal nature’s literature, as reflected in Table 1, which outlines the discrete number 
of times an author appears in the reference list of the 846-paper geography neoliberal 
nature’s data set; note the frequency of citations to the likes of Harvey, Peck, Brenner 
and Jessop, reflecting Castree’s 2008 observation. In his contribution to this forum, 
Morgan Robertson situates neoliberal nature’s scholarship within a longer trajectory 
of eco-Marxism, namely James O’Connor and Elmar Alvater. A primary innovation of 
this literature, he suggests, was to ground the often abstract and monolithic arguments 
of eco-marxists through the methodological approaches more common in economic 
geography and sociology (e.g. Jamie Peck and Neil Brenner). As Asiyanbi (this issue) 
explains, much of the general approach displays a commitment to studying variegated, 
‘actually existing’ processes (a terminology, for better or worse, firmly imprinted in 
geography’s lexicon). Further, as Robertson points out (this issue) this approach also 
aimed to avoid ‘gestural’, ‘unspecific’ ‘treatment(s) of nature’. 
 
Table 1. Thirty most cited authors found in the reference lists of the geography 
neoliberal nature data set. 
Name 
Number of citations 
in data set 
1 David Harvey 469 
2 Karen Bakker 443 
3 Noel Castree 439 
4 Jamie Peck 424 
5 Erik Swyngedouw 358 
6 James McCarthy 344 
7 Neil Brenner 234 
8 Becky Mansfield 207 
9 Michel Foucault 194 
10 Morgan Robertson 189 
11 Bob Jessop 188 
12 Gavin Bridge 186 
13 World Bank 181 
14 Nik Heynen 179 
15 Wendy Larner 168 
16 Tom Perreault 147 
17 Julie Guthman 143 
18 Neil Smith 143 
19 Bram Bu¨scher 132 
20 Paul Robbins 129 
21 Scott Prudham 122 
22 Dan Brockington 117 
23 Bruce Braun 116 
24 Tania Li 116 
25 Bruno Latour 115 
26 Kathy McAfee 115 
27 Tony Bebbington 111 
28 Karl Marx 109 
29 J.K. Gibson-Graham 105 
30 Michael Watts 104 
 
The ‘actually existing’ citation patterns of neoliberal natures 
Our citation analysis in Table 1 suggests that the most referenced work in neoliberal natures 
remains relatively homogenous in terms of gender and ethnicity/race. In geography, 7 out of 
the 30 are women (23%), and, while this is always tricky-business, it seems that there are no 
people of colour on this list (if you go to 50 most cited, it gets worse: 18% women, and then 
slightly better on racialized authors at 4%).5 
This is not surprising, given the broader White and male make-up of geography (e.g. 
Bonnett, 1997; Kobayashi et al., 2014; Mahtani, 2006; Peake and Kobayashi, 2002; Peake 
and Schein, 2000), reflective of Heynen et al.’s (2018) apt observation that the ‘geographies 
of injustice we examine also exist within the patriarchal [and racialized] conditions of our 
intimate social worlds’ (p. 1).6 Feminists and geographers of color like Pulido (2002), 
Gilmore (2002) and McKittrick (2006) compellingly argue that the whiteness and 
maleness of the discipline – a justice issue in its own right – also narrows analytical 
vision(s), restricting the kinds of questions asked and answers found, and this includes 
studies of the neoliberalization of nature (a point we return to below). 
It goes without saying that we wholeheartedly agree with Mott and Cockanyne (2017) 
that there is a need for scholars of the neoliberal nature’s literature to practice more ‘[c]areful 
and conscientious citation’ as one way to disrupt a sub-discipline that continues to exude 
‘sameness’ (p. 960). And we don’t place ourselves outside of this problem – as authors, we 
know we have contributed to this problem. Of course there is a need to do much more than 
that, as Mott and Cockayne and many others have long argued, from Bonnett (1997) to 
Kobayashi et al. (2014). Rectifying these kinds of shortcomings in our literature, and our 
discipline more broadly, will require concerted, sustained work that goes beyond the 
establishment of equity offices. 
To this end, a recently concluded large Canadian study (involving feminist geographer 
Audrey Kobayashi) found that ‘racialized and Indigenous faculty members are numerically 
underrepresented, and they experience racism in a wide variety of forms, personal and 
structural, both explicit and extremely subtle’ (Henry et al., 2017: 297). Despite growth in 
equity policies and ‘dedicated offices’, efforts ‘to address racism are limited or ineffective’ 
(p. 298). And – this is crucial – they found that the increasingly austere, neoliberal culture of 
the University exacerbates the struggles of Indigenous and people of color in Canadian 
universities as approaches to solving structural racism often focus on individuals rather 
than systemic problems. And even if diversity policies and new institutions are found 
ineffective, ‘the very fact that something . . . exists often becomes an excuse to avoid doing 
more’ (p. 303). These arguments will sound eerily familiar to any scholar of contemporary 
climate or biodiversity policy where a proliferation of initiatives, laws, policies and 
institutions mask that little is being accomplished, shielding decision makers from criticism. 
As with systemic problems like climate change, there is no silver bullet for addressing the 
ongoing whiteness of the University or geography. Henry et al. (2017) outline a ‘dirty dozen’ 
ways that gender and racial bias are maintained in the academy, ranging from wording of 
reference letters to Eurocentric disciplinary canons to disproportionate service work. 
Components of solutions range from doctoral student recruitment and the types of projects 
faculty support them to undertake (as suggested by Lave, this issue), to agitating for different 
kinds of, and more flexible, promotion criteria that are attentive to new models of scholarly 
engagement and analytical frameworks, all the way to organizing against the marketization 
of higher education that locks out working class students and many students of colour 
through huge fees, unsurvivable stipends and tenuous, casualized job prospects. In short, 
we must struggle against neoliberalism, and particularly its raced, gendered and classed 
aspects, in own our institutions if we are to improve our scholarly approach to contesting 
neoliberalization elsewhere. That is, while we think it is important to continue studying both 
old and new forms of hegemonic liberal processes (from austerity to financialization) as they 
continue to organize nature in ways that serve some more than others, there is a need to 
query them in other ways, and part of this is expanding whose perspectives are in the circle. 
 
Close to non-existing analytical frames in neoliberal natures 
Our data set suggests that feminist approaches are largely absent in the literature on the 
neoliberalization of nature.7 Searching through the abstracts, keywords and titles of the 
geography data set and only 17 papers use the term feminist, only 2% of papers; none of 
the anthropology papers use the term feminist. In geography only 47 papers turn up using 
the search term gender and since all the papers with term feminist are also captured in the 
search for the term gender, the two together total only 6% of the entire data. 
In anthropology, 9/189 (5%) use the term gender. While other research is needed, this 
suggests that the effects of neoliberalizing nature are not being substantially queried through 
a feminist analysis and that very few employ a gender lens (recognizing that these are not the 
same). Yet feminist approaches offer potent analytical frames for understanding 
neoliberalizing processes – from feminist geographical theorizations of finance (e.g. 
Pollard, 2013), feminist political economy (e.g. Fraser, 2014; Mies, 1986) and social 
reproduction theory (Bhattacharya, 2017), to name some of many. To illustrate, we point to 
the work by Mansfield (2012) on seafood consumption advisories, which productively draws 
from feminist literature on reproduction and Foucauldian theorizations of neoliberal 
biopolitics to demonstrate how responsibility for the health and well-being of the 
population is placed on individualized, gendered bodies. 
Within neoliberal nature’s literature, the kinds of questions largely not being asked, and 
answers not being found, also include those related to the co-constitution of neoliberalizing 
and racializing processes. Roberts and Mahtani (2010) identify this as a big gap within the 
broader geographical literature on neoliberalism, arguing that while geographers do draw 
out the uneven, often racialized effects of neoliberal processes, they fail to investigate how 
racializing processes can be constitutive of neoliberal processes. They push scholars to use 
racial analytics to explain, not simply describe. 
Roberts and Mahtani’s critique emphatically applies to the neoliberal nature’s literature, 
which hardly seems to study even the racialized effects of neoliberal environmental 
governance. We queried our data set for the terms race, racial and racism in the titles, 
abstracts and keywords and only 26 discrete papers returned in geography. The terms 
white or whiteness only added three to those papers already identified, for a total of 
29/846 (3%). In Anthropology, five papers return for the same terms – 5/189 (3%). While 
an admittedly a coarse analytical method, it does suggest limited engagement with a social 
fact we suspect most fellow travelers would agree is of vital importance.8 It also suggests, as 
per Roberts and Mahtani’s argument, that we are missing an analytical approach that can 
help not only describe effects, but also explain. 
There is exemplary work to point to in this regard, including papers by Pulido (2016) and 
Ranganathan’s (2016) on the neoliberal water crisis in Flint, Michigan. The former outlines 
what an analytic of racial capitalism brings to explain the situation in Flint; the latter 
understands the crisis as paradigmatic of ‘racial liberalism’s illiberal legacies’ (p. 19). 
Heeding Roberts and Mahtani’s (2010) call, Ranganathan highlights the importance of 
foregrounding racial formations, defined as ‘the historical processes by which economic 
and political forces determine racial categories’ (p. 20) for understanding the spatial 
dynamics of property ownership in cities (and otherwise) and for explaining who is 
subject to poisoned water. Both Pulido and Ranganathan emphasize the way that ‘racial 
logics infuse austerity’, not only in differential, racialized effects, but as formative logics that 
undergird ‘fiscal solvency above all else’ (p. 4), including poisoning children with lead. Like 
so many other facets of neoliberalism, these articles point to how austerity is not ‘neo’ for 
many. Along these lines, Pasternak (2016) links present neoliberal austerity to the much 
longer, racialized histories of settler colonialism in Canada, austerity is a long-standing tool 
of colonialism. More broadly, such scholars emphasize that colonial and racial hierarchies 
are foundational to the workings of capitalism and to the workings of liberalism, and thus 
also, to neoliberalism (for recent work in this vein see Krupar and Ehlers, 2017, McClintock, 
2018, Pettygrove and Ghose, 2018). 
Both Pulido and Ranganathan draw from the Black Radical Tradition (BRT) of DuBois, 
Robinson, James and Williams, which Pulido describes as the ‘great engine of social change 
in the US’, and thus also ‘a great asset in the fight against neoliberalism and capitalism’s 
complete domination of people, places and nature’ (p. 12) (see also Heynen, 2016). Scholars 
like Pulido and Ranganathan demonstrate how the BRT explains intersecting processes of 
oppression and domination in the long and short(er) duree, (e.g. a crucial contribution also 
made by settler colonial studies and social reproduction theory). These analytical traditions 
push scholars to place the ‘neo’ moment in the ‘longer historical, political and economic 
contexts in which vulnerability, contamination and decay are produced’ (Pulido, 2016: 1), to 
understand present austerity and new financial experimentation, including crumbling 
infrastructures, as part of a longer lineage of colonial and racialized abandonment (see 
also Davis and Todd, 2017; Patel and Moore, 2017; Whyte, 2016). If neoliberal 
environmental governance is often understood as a kind of fix driven by a ‘class practice 
of the most powerful, geographically mobile capitalists’ (Glassman, 2007: 96), this literature 
calls us to think about hierarchical difference making as a crucial, inseparable part these 
same processes, ‘accumulation by difference-making’ (Dempsey and Collard, forthcoming). 
Indeed, if the neoliberal state is an austere one obsessed with fiscal solvency, it is also one 
that also has increased state capacity to protect extraction above all, as demonstrated in the 
military-grade response to Standing Rock in 2016 (Whyte, 2016), the growth of racialized 
state surveillance, such as that focused on Indigenous activists opposing fossil fuel extraction 
in Canada (Pasternak, 2014), and the increasing regularity of state or extrastate killings of 
environmental activists, often indigenous people, around the world (Watts, 2018). 
In sum, neoliberal natures need currently under-represented theoretical approaches, from 
feminist to critical race and beyond. But – and this is a big but – it is crucial that these 
literatures not be viewed as the ‘hot new thing’, akin to putting on the latest, most 
fashionable shirt. These are embodied, praxis-filled literatures that emerge from long 
histories of struggle; they demand careful, slow reading as well as a heavy dose of 
responsibility and accountability to the struggles and communities from which they 
emerge. It is certainly not our place to describe what such accountability looks like, 
precisely, but we do know that there are risks of ongoing White and male appropriation 
and extraction that must be reflectively and thoughtfully considered, particularly when the 
neoliberal nature’s literature – and especially the authors cite – remains so dominated by 
White and male scholars. This brings us back directly back the question of who is and isn’t in 
the University, and to questions of what kind of work is valued within it. 
 
Conclusion: The dominance, marginality and failures 
of neoliberal natures 
Perhaps above all, the neoliberal nature’s literature is defined by incessant criticism, even 
criticism of some things that seem, on the surface, progressive. Holifield (2004) critiques 
environmental justice within the US Environmental Protection Agency, Guthman (2004) 
slices and dices organic food labelling, Baird and Quastel (2011) spear dolphin-safe tuna, and 
Huber (2016) slays even, gasp, carbon taxes: all of these are understood as examples 
of neoliberal market rule in more and more spheres of our lives and in many cases, more 
of the same profiteering by the 1%. These critiques matter, as they often draw attention to a 
problematic siloing or rendering technical of environmental issues within mainstream efforts, 
as though the ‘environment’ can be isolated from other issues, namely wealth inequality, 
persistent racial and gender injustices and ongoing colonialism. This scholarship refuses to 
be hedged in by the pragmatic or the necessary; it offers us what Brown (2009) calls untimely 
critique, one that insists on ‘alternative possibilities and perspectives in a seemingly closed 
political and epistemological universe’ (p. 14). 
Yet we know that many of these institutions like the EPA or initiatives like organic farming 
and labelling are trying to improve air quality and reduce pesticides.  A challenge, then, 
is how to know when ‘these governmental forms are simply ‘flanking projects’ and when they 
represent real political gains’ (Larner, 2007: 219), particularly significant gains for working 
people and the socio-ecological conditions that their lives depend on. As Mansfield (2007) 
asks, are new fisheries property markets animated by neoliberal imperatives or social justice? 
In her case, it’s both and neither – infused with multiple logics. This is why empirical, closegrained 
‘context-contingent analyses’ (Sparke, 2006, quoted in Heynen et al., 2007: 4)  
still matters, as much depends on one’s entry point, on the specific conjuncture, on who and 
what is involved in conceiving or perhaps hi-jacking the ‘neoliberal’ project to be otherwise. 
This latter point is on display in Tracey Osborne’s contribution to this issue, where she 
highlights the counter-movements to forest carbon markets. There she charts the emergence 
of an Indigenous approach to REDD, one that mutates a preeminent neoliberal climate 
change policy into a set of politics that advocate the ‘de-commodification of land’ and as a 
‘mechanism to reclaim forests from state governments’. 
This leads to back that tricky question of whether or not neoliberalism is a helpful or 
hindering analytical and political concept for resistance. In a short response to the series of 
chapters in the book Neoliberal Environments, Larner (2007) suggested that the authors tended 
to gloss over ‘contradictions and inconsistencies’ that did not quite fit the label neoliberal. She 
suggested that the authors are focused on ‘recognizing neoliberalism rather than taking the 
complexity of forms of environmental governance as their starting point’ (p. 218). And by 
seeking coherence, she argued that these critical scholars could unwittingly be contributing to 
a hegemony that doesn’t really exist. But while the utility, accuracy or even riskiness of using 
of the term ‘neoliberalism’ remains a topic of debate, the continuing need for the pointed 
analysis that has typified the literature is clear, and might be made even more powerful with 
the inclusion of new scholars and an expanded analytical toolkit. Whether or not one agrees 
with Smith’s (2007) suggestion that ‘we are currently living through a period in which the core 
socio-economic relationship with nature is being dramatically transformed’ (p. 17), or are just 
seeing slight variations in the long duree of the liberal capitalist organization of nature, there is 
still much work to do if we are to effectively contest the surprising, dynamic, novel, and 
pernicious inflections of capital that are yet to come. 
Notes 
1. For the purposes of this discussion, we agree with Pinson and Journel (2016) who define 
neoliberalism as, ‘the set of intellectual streams, policy orientations and regulatory arrangements 
that strive to extend market mechanisms, relations, discipline and ethos to an ever-expanding 
spectrum of spheres of social activities, and all this through relying on strong State intervention’ 
(p. 137). 
2. With invaluable research assistance from Mollie Holmburg and Andrew Schuldt, the data were 
derived through the following method. First, a list of key terms was generated to query the Web of 
Science database and produce an initial list of texts. The search was limited to journal articles from 
the social science, and arts and humanities collections and texts listing geography and anthropology 
as the primary discipline, and the years 2000–2017. Web of science is not comprehensive, for 
example it does not index Capitalism, Nature, Socialism. Using the topic field, which indexes 
titles, keywords and abstracts, the following search terms were used: ((neo-liberal* or 
neoliberal*) or financializ* or marketiz* or commoditization or commodification or offsets or 
austeri* or privati*) AND (nature* or environment* or biodiversi* or climate or carbon or genes 
or adaptation or conserv* or water or wetland* or forest* or ‘Urban political ecology’ or energy Or 
agricultur* or mining or oil or fish* or ‘fair trade’ or disaster or hazard or ‘ecosystem services’ or 
certification or waste or pollution). The resulting list of 1404(Geo)/415 (Anthro) was pruned to 846/ 
189 by eliminating articles deemed to be ‘false positives’, that is, where keywords appeared but did 
not touch on the neoliberalization of nature. Our criteria for sorting was the broad definition forged 
in Heynen et al. (2007a), where they call for consideration of the ‘ways in which environmental 
governance, and environmentalism as a set of political movements, coincide, collide, articulate and 
even constitute the emergence of neoliberalism’ (p. 9). We applied a broad criteria for substantive 
topics, including examinations of neoliberalism and bodies (e.g. Guthman, 2011), studies of 
neoliberalizing processes and disasters (e.g. Katz, 2008) and urban environmental processes (e.g. 
While et al., 2004). 
3. By March 2017, 24 countries had climate liability cases: 654 cases in the US and 230 in other 
countries (see UNEP, 2017).  
4. For example, the World Bank recently launched a new program for climate-vulnerable cities in the 
Global South to access catastrophe insurance; this is simultaneously a direct enrollment of new 
locations and scales into circuits of finance, as well as the deeper integration of those cities into 
financial circuits as they are ‘capacitized’ through ‘technical assistance’ in things like gaining a credit 
rating, producing climate data, and negotiating public–private partnerships – themselves a key 
technology of austerity around the world as public coffers are (portrayed) as thin and requiring 
the capital, efficiency, and nous of private business. 
5. Things improve ever-so-slightly but only on the gender front when one examines the most cited 
papers within our dataset, that is, the most cited papers of the 846-paper dataset. Of the 30 most 
highly cited papers, 30% have first authors that are women, none by people of color; the numbers 
stay the same in the top 50 most cited, 0 by people of color, 30% have women first author papers. 
6. We repeated the exercise in Anthropology journals and found the cognate literature ever-so slightly 
more diverse in terms of racialized scholars. 
7. We note the high citations of Wendy Larner, Becky Mansfield, and Julie Guthman (Table 1), all 
known for employing feminist approaches. 
8. To add to our findings, we then searched the full text of the twenty most cited papers in Geography 
our data set and found that these terms appeared in only three papers, only one time in each. 
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What are the accomplishments of the ongoing process of neoliberalization of nature? 
The ‘how’ of this question is, arguably, as important as the ‘what’ of it. In other words, 
the epistemological concern around how we analyze the accomplishments of neoliberal 
nature is as crucial as what those accomplishments are. In this commentary, I reflect on 
the question of scale as one important dimension of the epistemological concern in 
articulating the accomplishments of neoliberalism. I suggest that the level at which 
scholars seek to understand the accomplishments of neoliberal nature matters, thus 
signalling a politics of scale, which connotes a number of imperatives. After outlining 
these imperatives, I consider the scalar tension in recent literature on financialization and 
Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES). I conclude by highlighting how the scalar tension 
might be steered in order to take account of the full range of ways in which neoliberal 
capitalism underlies significant socio-environmental change. 
If, as Sayre (2005) claims, scale is inherent in all observations – and one could add, 
analysis and interventions – then a particular politics of scale becomes evident in the 
choices of social actors (Mansfield and Haas, 2006; Neumann, 2009). This is true of the 
scalar choices of scholars – be it general or specific; global, regional or local; the universal 
abstractive or the specific actual – as they seek to understand the logics, manifestations and 
accomplishments of neoliberal capitalism in the environment. And this awareness of the 
politics of scale has a long history in critical geographies of neoliberal capitalism and its 
metabolic relations with the environment. A trajectory of scalar engagement in the political 
economy of the environment can be traced to the 1980s and 1990s when the fruitful 
integration of historical materialism with geographical thought was stabilizing through 
the works of critical, especially Marxist scholars including Neil Smith, Henri Lefebvre, 
Doreen Massey, David Harvey, Erik Swyngedouw and others. Quite central to this 
literature was the spatiality of historical materialism and the dynamic co-production of 
social processes, scales and ecologies. These central ideas were accompanied by explicit 
elaboration of their implications for how we might apprehend capital’s deepened 
penetration of the environment and social life broadly (Harvey, 1993). 
Building on these early foundational works, scalar debates among geographers studying 
neoliberalism intensified in the early 2000s with at least two special issues in Environment 
and Planning A (34: 5) and Antipode (34:3). For instance, Brenner and Theodore (2002, 344) 
would theorize ‘actually existing neoliberalisms’, directing attention to the specific, 
variegated dimension of neoliberalism, or what Peck and Tickell (2002, 380) described 
as ‘local neoliberalisms’, emphasizing the variegated forms that neoliberalism takes in places. 
This literature was also clear about the ways in which local processes articulate with and 
mutually rework wider neoliberal structures. Yet close to the end of that decade, there was 
still the problem of the ‘perplexingly amorphous’ nature of neoliberalism and the lack of 
clarity as to ‘what geographical scales and levels of theoretical abstraction we can identify it 
substantively’ (Castree, 2008: 156; Heynen et al., 2007). 
Nevertheless, the rapid proliferation of diverse case studies examining ‘actually existing 
neoliberalisms’ led to the recentring of the question of scale of analysis by the end of the 
2000s. This saw renewed efforts to complement the erstwhile focus on the specifics with a 
rigorous theorization of general patterns in the operation of neoliberal natures and 
scholars’ engagement with the process (Bakker, 2010; Castree, 2008; Heynen et al., 
2007; Igoe and Brockington, 2007). For Castree (2010), grappling with the level at 
which neoliberalization should be understood requires the development of a schema of 
neoliberalism’s ontological existence. For instance, he points to the ‘3 p’s’ of neoliberalism 
referring to its existence, at once, as an overarching philosophy; a general policy 
programme; and a suit of specific policies (Castree, 2010). Such a nested schema suggests 
at least two important imperatives: that analysts make explicit their scale of engagement 
with neoliberalism and they specify what is at stake in engaging with neoliberalism at any 
particular level (cf. Mansfield and Haas, 2006). Heynen and Perkins (2005: 192) pointed to 
another imperative when they observed that ‘scalar dialectics in useful in understanding 
the impacts of neoliberalization on global and local environments’. Here, the focus in on 
analysing neoliberalization as a processes and a web of relations as opposed to a ‘fetishized 
‘‘thing’’’ (Fletcher and Bu¨ scher, 2017; Heynen and Perkins, 2005: 192). Meanwhile, Peck 
and Tickell (2012), alert us to a methodological implication of such a dialectical work 
which entails breaking down the polarizing scalar tendencies between the globalism of 
Marxian political economy approach and the localism of poststructuralist approach. 
With this background, I turn to the scalar tension in recent effort to understand the 
accomplishments of the neoliberalization of nature. 
 
Scale and accomplishments in financialization and PES 
The way in which scalar tensions have played out in analyses of the accomplishments of 
neoliberalization is reflected in at least two major strands of work. One is the debate around 
environmental financialization, a core aspect of the deepening logics of capital in the 
environment. If the ongoing process of nature commodification is marked by the tendency 
to abstract, homogenise and universalise, this tendency appears even more amplified in the 
process of environmental financialization – a process defined by the rise of the financial 
sector, instruments and logics in the environment. Indeed, it is the largely virtual and 
performative dimension – e.g. flourishing financial discourses and concepts, spectacular 
events, symbolic transactions and alienating universalizing calculative practices – which is 
said to account for a significant part of the accomplishments of neoliberal finance in 
conservation (Dempsey, 2017; Sullivan, 2013, 2017). This is true insofar as the general 
level of aggregated performativity of finance is the focus of analysis here. Therefore, 
the implications of analysing financialization at this level must be made explicit: the 
reported level of performativity of finance is a direct consequence of this scale of analysis. 
As such, the call for ‘research effort to drill-down’ to specific material basis (Bracking, 2015: 
2347; Dempsey, 2017), reflects a much needed imperative to go beyond the current scale 
of analysis by attending to the specific historical–geographical basis of financialization 
in places. 
Linked to this is the major indication that, on the whole, the incursion of neoliberal 
capital into nature has been thin, variegated, hybridized, frustrated, even stymied in some 
places (e.g. Bigger, 2017; Dempsey and Suarez, 2016; Fletcher and Breitling, 2012; Milne and 
Adams, 2012). Indeed, as Dempsey (2017: 201) notes concerning the achievements of the 
financialization of conservation, ‘failure is a big part of the story to study and tell’. Yet even 
if capital appears to falter in remaking nature in its own image, it still shapes and transforms 
socio-ecologies in a whole range of other specific ways that may not neatly align with 
descriptions of neoliberal success or failure. For instance, regardless of whether or not 
they lead to successful carbon markets, neoliberal carbon projects might, nevertheless, be 
linked to a range of other transformations including institutional restructuring that further 
centralizes forest governance, shifts in resource-based accumulation patterns and impacts on 
collateral resource economies e.g. timber, charcoal and non-timber forest products (see 
Asiyanbi, 2016; Gray, 2017; Lohmann, 2016). These more-than-market impacts are 
another important aspect of the accomplishments of neoliberalization – the remaking of 
socio-ecologies in a whole range of ways often unforeseen and unintended. This difference 
between evaluations of ‘market-ness’ or neoliberal success/failure and the specific existing 
effects is thus, a quintessential scalar question. While the former tends towards an evaluation 
against the general features and logics of neoliberalism, the latter instead focuses on specific 
manifestations of the impacts of neoliberalism for what they mean in particular contexts. 
The second strand of the literature that illustrates the importance of the scalar tension for 
analysing the accomplishment of neoliberalism is the body of work on PES. A significant 
debate persists on whether and to what extent variegated PES projects manifest market 
principles and can thus be regarded as neoliberal (Fletcher and Bu¨ scher, 2017; Hahn 
et al., 2015; Van Hecken et al., 2018). While a number of studies here take a narrower 
conception of neoliberalism that equates to pure, functional markets or market-like 
exchange, others clearly emphasize the overarching neoliberal philosophy and provenance 
of projects that inevitably variegate as they unfold (see McAfee and Shapiro, 2010; Milne 
and Adams, 2012; Osborne and Shapiro-Garza, 2018). As such, a challenge in the PES 
literature is the tension between the strand that tends to under-specify the general 
neoliberal provenance of projects (see Fletcher and Buscher, 2017) and that which tends 
to under-emphasize the particularity of specific cases (see Van Hecken et al., 2018), thereby 
underscoring the scalar tension in this literature. Both Fletcher and Buscher (2017) and their 
interlocutors, Van Hecken et al. (2018) called for a similar response to the scalar tension – an 
integration of the micro and macro aspects of neoliberalism and a dialectical approach to 
structure and agency in neoliberal projects, respectively. Yet, the intensity of the debate 
between the two strands reflects the difficulty in thoroughly and consistently deploying a 
dialectical understanding of neoliberalism’s accomplishments in PES. 
It is, thus, clear that the scale at which scholars analyse the accomplishments of neoliberal 
environments matters. This calls for sustained efforts at unravelling the politics of scale in 
the analysis of neoliberalism’s impacts, partly by making explicit the scales of analyses, what 
is at stake at different analytical levels and how analysts are empowered to render certain 
effects of neoliberalism visible at particular levels (Mansfield and Haas, 2006; Neumann, 
2009). Another imperative here is to deepen scalar dialectics by galvanizing commitment to 
the processual nature of neoliberalization. A focus on relations and processes might take 
questions of accomplishments beyond teleological notions of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ and into 
the actual ways that neoliberalism reworks the social world both, as planned and 
unwittingly. The recent body of work emphasizing the complex constitutive processes and 
assemblages of neoliberalization is important here (Asiyanbi, 2017; Sullivan, 2017; 
Wilshusen and MacDonald, 2017). Ultimately, questions of scalar tensions and relations 
are not merely a matter of analytical expediency, they are also politically charged, 
significantly shaping our understanding of the ways that neoliberalism is transforming 
socio-ecologies and how we might respond to foster more desirable futures. 
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In the introduction to their special issue of Capitalism, Nature, Socialism on neoliberal 
natures, Heynen and Robbins (2005) underscore the need to think of neoliberalism as a 
process – neoliberalization – emphasizing that it entails shifts in human–environment 
relations at a range of scales. While the authors focus primarily on four major shifts that 
are inherent to nature’s neoliberalization (governance, privatization, enclosure, valuation) – 
categories that are also picked up and extended by Noel Castree in his review of the literature 
(2008) – the centrality of these shifts is established using a set of criteria that I also find useful 
for understanding the changing nature of neoliberal natures. They write, ‘there has been a 
notable and disturbing shift in the way that more-than-human nature has been conceived, 
controlled, distributed, managed and produced’ (2005: 6). By focusing on these 
overarching categories of conception, control, distribution, management and production of 
nature, one can begin to understand how the relationship between capitalism and nature 
has shifted and mutated over the last 10–15 years. 
I center this paper around one major evolution in socio-natural relations under capitalism, 
arguing that the growing power and presence of financial investor-owners in environmental 
conservation and management (Kay, 2017; Smith, 2009) has led to a reformulation of how 
value comes to be extracted from nature, reshaping trajectories of neoliberalization. 
Or, to use the phrasing above, financial ownership of land, infrastructure and natural 
resources have critically altered the trajectories of how nature is conceived, controlled, 
distributed, managed and produced by capital. In particular, I argue that financial actors 
have come to prioritize natures that can be made adaptable, from which they can produce a 
range of distinctive (but still deeply interconnected) assets along a range of temporalities. As I 
have noted elsewhere, the focus on adaptability is a product of the structure of shareholder owned 
corporations, whose investors demand short time horizons of ownership coupled with 
high and consistent rates of profit from investments in land and resources (Kay, 2017). What is 
novel here, and what was under-discussed in some of the earlier literature on neoliberal 
natures, is the overt focus on both flexibility and time by this particular class of capitalist 
actors. While financialization marks yet another phase in the reworking of state–capital– 
nature relations in order to open up new arenas for accumulation – making it consistent 
with what much of the neoliberal natures literature describes – the reworking is one that is 
consonant with the changing nature of accumulation, particularly in the Global North. 
Recent work on ‘flex crops’ in global farmland acquisition offers a conceptual example, 
one which I provide while also acknowledging that there are a number of critical differences 
with regard to land acquisitions across the Global North and South. This work focuses on 
how land comes to be viewed by investor-owners as an asset embodying both ‘flexible-ness’ 
and ‘multiple-ness’ (Borras et al., 2016), traits that are both distinct and interlocking, and 
which I argue carry relevance beyond global farmland acquisition. Using the example of 
palm oil, Borras et al. describe the range of possible futures that motivate investment 
in commodity production landscapes. As the authors argue, cooking oil can be produced 
in the present while awaiting an emergent biodiesel market. Further still, they note that the 
concurrent building of novel storylines about the future are critical for alternate pathways of 
profit-making with into the longer-range future, ‘to jump start business undertakings, e.g. to 
raise investments, lure investors, entice governments, persuade affected communities and 
orchestrate favorable media coverage’ (2016: 94). Further still, the same landscapes could 
be switched out of biofuels production altogether and into real estate (Baka, 2013), may have 
other useful property rights attached to them, or could potentially be enrolled in a range of 
extant or future environmental market schemes. 
The growing interest in acquiring land and resources for adaptable purposes builds on, 
but also diverges from, trends of neoliberalization. The neoliberalization of nature is 
characterized by the reworking of the relationships and boundaries between states and 
markets. This includes, for example, the devolution or offloading of responsibility, the 
privatization of public assets and creation of new forms of and rights to property, and the 
preferencing of market-based transactions and solutions to environmental problems 
(Heynen et al., 2007). The demand for adaptable, or flexible, natures, however, stems 
primarily from the growing power and presence of finance capital in natural resource and 
agricultural industries (Gunnoe, 2014; Ouma, 2014). This is partially due to the fact that the 
2007–2008 global economic crisis unleashed a new interest in acquiring productive assets like 
land, often because natural resource landscapes like timber are either uncorrelated or reverse 
correlated to stocks; and partially due to a major legacy of neoliberalization (and to the 
restructuring of state-market relations more generally): the fact that many extant 
environmental markets and governance schemes have been around long enough now to 
have had a chance to evolve, fail and adapt, providing new openings for experimental and 
adaptive forms of profit-making. 
While it was acknowledged in many key publications on neoliberal natures that market 
actors are unlikely to provide the same long-term commitments or necessary infrastructural 
investments that the state would be required to, these actors were, at least in most instances, 
keeping the assets they acquired in the same industries. Swyngedouw (2005), for example, 
notes that the shift toward privatized management of water infrastructure meant that the 
state had to fill in the gaps with regard to long-term investments related to provisioning: ‘put 
simply, there is a clear disincentive to invest in not directly profitable long-term activities like 
leakage control in contrast to productivity enhancing investments that improve short-term 
profitability. It is not a surprise, therefore, that the state or other parts of the public sector 
have to mediate these contradictions’ (p. 55). While short-termism is a contiguous trait 
throughout scholarship on neoliberal natures (Heynen and Perkins, 2005; Peluso, 2007; 
Swyngedouw, 2005), the acquisition of land, resources and infrastructure for flexible uses 
along multiple temporalities diverges from what was described in earlier work on neoliberal 
natures. To this point: whether they have new owners, regulatory norms or governance 
structures, enclosed fisheries are still being used primarily to catch and sell fish 
(Mansfield, 2004), while privatized water utilities are still primarily in the business of 
provisioning water for household and agricultural uses (Bakker, 2005; Swyngedouw, 
2005). Yet, with the example of farmland, financial investor–owners are not just interested 
in finding the most profitable means of producing food, but also are looking to increase the 
value of land and the operations that take place on it in multiple and temporally variegated 
ways, viewing it as yet another asset class on which they can bet (Fairbairn, 2014). 
My own work is focused in North America, a major testing ground for early neoliberal 
reforms (Harvey, 2007), and now a key site for testing creative approaches to the 
financialization of natures. While there is ongoing debate about the definitions of and 
conceptual limits to ‘financialization’ (Christophers, 2015), particularly with regard to 
farmland (Fairbairn, 2015; Ouma, 2015), within the US, there has been a measurable 
increase in investor–ownership of land and natural resources in recent decades (Gunnoe, 
2014). Two brief examples illustrate how investor-owners are increasingly interested in land 
and related infrastructure as assets that are ‘flexible’ and ‘multiple’, with regard to both uses 
and temporalities. 
The recent acquisition of vineyards by Harvard University in drought-stricken Paso 
Robles, CA provides one example. Through one of its investment arms, Brodiaea Inc., 
the Harvard University Endowment has spent more than $60 million since 2012 to 
purchase over 10,000 acres around California’s Central Coast wine-growing region 
(Philpott, 2015). The acquisition has allowed Harvard to participate in the booming wine 
grape market in the short-to-medium term (Valdmanis, 2015), while the real estate value of 
the land itself serves as a hedge against inflation and a longer-term investment opportunity. 
Furthermore, by acquiring permits to drill some of the deepest wells in the region, Harvard is 
also betting on the growing value of an under-regulated and increasingly scarce public good: 
groundwater (ibid). In this instance, the enclosure of a common-pool resource, water, is not 
straightforward, and is bound up in a range of well-established markets (farmland, real 
estate), albeit ones that rely on the fictitious commodification of land. All of these 
opportunities can be exploited along a continuum of temporalities. Some of these profitmaking 
activities could and should be called neoliberal (e.g. the enclosure of groundwater) 
while others do not easily fit the description (e.g. growing grapes in a region with 
longstanding big agribusiness interests [Walker, 2004]). 
Similarly, investor–owners are increasingly acquiring the landed assets and infrastructure 
of natural resource extraction and processing as a means of gaining access to lucrative tax 
credits and deductions. In Maine, where I have done research, it became common practice 
for private equity investors to acquire paper mills, reopen them and reap the benefits of New 
Markets Tax Credits and other state and federal tax benefits for providing employment in 
disinvested rural areas, and then shut down again once the tax credits run out (Richardson, 
2015). The tax system becomes yet another avenue by which public goods – in this case, tax 
revenues – are able to be enclosed, but in this case, like the one described above, 
longstanding nature–society relationships form the basis of novel configurations of 
ownership, management, and control that generate alternate pathways of accumulation in 
the very short term. 
I want to be clear that I am not saying that there is something novel about buying land 
with the recognition that one could use it for multiple purposes. Small-scale farmers around 
the world regularly respond to commodity booms and busts by shifting their production 
toward more lucrative crops. Similarly, ranchers in many parts of the United States are 
aware of the fact that their land would likely fetch high prices for suburban real estate 
development, yet this development potential is not likely to be the reason that they 
acquired their land in the first place. What is new, however, is the increased presence of 
financial investors as a major class of owners, who – as a result of their shareholder 
orientations – use land differently, bear risk differently, engage community differently 
and generate profits differently. For this growing class of owners, natures are being 
produced as adaptable, and the temporalities of value production and extraction differ 
from the myriad attempts to neoliberalize nature that geographers wrote about 
extensively in the early-to-mid 2000s. 
The editors of this forum have asked us to consider the material-semiotic effects of three 
decades of neoliberal hegemony in the environmental register. I began by noting that one 
way of charting the changing relationship between nature and capital is to utilize a set of five 
categories: conception, control, distribution, management and production. Through these 
categories, it is possible to follow continuities and differences in ways that provide a 
picture of the changing nature of neoliberal natures. I have argued that the growing 
power and presence of financial investor–owners in a range of landscapes and natural 
resource industries has meant that natures are being reframed, or reconceptionalized, as 
flexible. Control has not just shifted from the public to private sector, as was the case 
under neoliberal governance, but in many instances it has also shifted from corporate to 
financial control. Financial investor–owners have differing motives and timelines, meaning 
they control land with differing aims and outcomes than other market actors. In certain 
ways, financialization diffuses distribution, as many land and resource owners are working on 
behalf of shareholders. Yet, while control has been defused in certain ways, there has 
nevertheless been a consolidation of financial/institutional ownership of natural resource 
landscapes (Gunnoe, 2014). These lands are being managed to be adaptable assets, which 
can produce profits in a range of ways over a range of temporalities. Taking all of this into 
account, there is a real need to understand what sorts of natures are being produced through 
financialization, with close attention to differences across landscape types, as well as between 
the Global North and South. One hopes that future work on the intersections of 
neoliberalism and nature will pay close attention to these categories – which are in many 
ways emblematic of the broader concerns of political ecology writ large – and that this work 
will maintain continuity with one of the greatest strengths of the neoliberal nature’s tradition 
(Castree, 2008): empirically rich and place-based case research. 
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It is a bit weird, or perhaps a lot contrary, to argue in this forum that neoliberal natures – 
one of the primary foci of critical nature/society research since the early 2000s – is not much 
to write home about (much less to write approximately three gazillion journal articles 
about). But over the last few years, I have come to think that there is very little ‘neo’ 
about neoliberal environmental conservation policies and practices, despite the fact that 
I’ve spent much of my academic life researching them. 
Unlike in areas such as healthcare or education, where the advent of neoliberal policies 
produced starkly different outcomes, the reconfiguration of nature/capital in response to 
neoliberal policy looks much like its previous iterations. ‘Neoliberal nature’ is not just old 
wine, but old, old bottles. The shiny new labels (green finance! markets for ecosystem 
services!) have been pasted over basic processes of accumulation, exploitation, and 
expropriation that have characterized capitalism as an ecological regime (Moore, 2015) 
for more than half a millennium. 
The on-the-ground consequences for people and ecosystems from the phenomena, we 
have been referring to as ‘neoliberal natures’ are important, but they are also old: 
enclosure, loss of livelihoods and sacrificing ecosystems to enable development. For 
example, Kelly Kay’s work analyzes a quintessential example of neoliberal nature: 
privatization via land trusts and conservation easements. And yet the consequences she 
describes in Maine today (Kay, 2017) look a lot like what Thompson (2013) has shown 
us about conservation in the Northeastern US since the 1800s: rich folks enclosing common 
resources and defending them with armed guards, creating eerily similar loss of livelihoods to 
what Kay describes today. Thanks to the excellent scholarship on neoliberal natures, we can 
point to many comparable examples. Sarah Knuth has argued the LEEDS certification and 
the green building movement simply remarket as green virtue building practices adopted for 
bluntly economic reasons (2016), and Lansing (2013, 2014) demonstrates that the much 
vaunted Payments for Ecosystem Services program in Costa Rica does little if anything to 
produce outcomes different from pre-neoliberal conservation practices, instead reproducing 
existing environmental management practices and political–economic inequalities. 
The on-the-ground consequences for ecosystems are less certain, as studies of the physical 
impacts of neoliberal environmental management are fairly rare. In my work with Martin 
Doyle and Morgan Robertson on stream mitigation banking (SMB) in the U.S. (e.g. Doyle 
et al., 2015), we found that this ecosystem service market effectively buttresses existing trends 
rather than changing them. Instead of better protecting the environment, as advocates for 
market-based environmental management claim, SMB reinforces existing restoration 
practices that are at best unhelpful for stream ecosystems (Sudduth et al., 2011, Violin 
et al., 2011). Further, SMB enables the continuation of weak enforcement of the U.S. 
Clean Water Act’s mandate to prevent harm, facilitating the ongoing loss of stream 
habitat. In practice, then, this market-based approach reproduces the failures of the 
command-and-control approach it was supposed to improve upon. Thus the existing body of 
work on neoliberal natures strongly suggests that its impacts on people and landscapes are 
far from neo. 
What then of green finance and the shiny new labels on those old, old bottles? As has 
become increasingly clear in the last few years, there is remarkably little fire to go with all the 
smoke financial types are blowing. The amount of money flowing through market-based 
conservation is tiny (Dempsey and Suarez, 2016), particularly when compared with estimates 
of the value of ecosystem services (Constanza et al., 1997, 2014). As Chris Knudson has 
shown, novel forms of risk insurance are not selling anywhere near as well as their promoters 
had hoped (2016), and conservation finance is similarly unimpressive in terms of capital 
flows and rates of return, as Jessica Dempsey and Patrick Bigger’s ongoing research is 
showing (Dempsey and Bigger, unpublished). Further, as Kay (2017) has shown, even in 
the small markets that are actually moving forward, the purportedly novel tactics of green 
finance consist of old favorites, such as sub-dividing and selling parcels. 
If not new impacts on livelihoods or ecosystems, perhaps what is really neo here, as 
Dempsey and Suarez (2016) have argued, is the conversion of environmental managers 
into good neoliberal subjects, so that the baseline values and expectations of the 
environmental community shift in fundamentally pro-market ways. I am unconvinced 
that this is anything more than pragmatic lip service to the current funding paradigm for 
many staff at environmental agencies and NGOS. Kate Bishop, for example, showed 
that a core group of development professionals managed to keep the same palm oil expeller 
projects running in West Africa for three decades by framing their work as exemplary of very 
different international development paradigms, from Appropriate Technology to microlending 
(Bishop, 2015). My hunch is that the current wave of allegiance to neoliberal 
conservation will be similarly transitory, particularly given the well-documented 
ambivalence of many in the environmental community towards market-based approaches 
(Dempsey, 2016, particularly ch. 4; Fisher and Brown, 2014; Sandbrook et al., 2013). 
The novelty or lack thereof of neoliberal environmental management may sound 
academic, in the negative sense of that term, but I believe it raises a far more important 
question: what are the intellectual and political consequences of framing our analyses of 
nature/capital through the lens of neoliberal nature? Put differently, what do we lose and 
what do we gain by claiming that the phenomena we study are somehow importantly 
different from nature/capital pre-1970s?9 
We in the critical nature/society community need to consider the intellectual implications 
of that claim for the things we choose to study and those we choose to ignore. For example, 
which are we more likely to encourage: a dissertation project on green bonds or biodiversity 
offsetting, or on the incremental loss of life from poor air quality in communities adjacent to 
major roadways or the catastrophic loss of wetland habitat worldwide over the last century? 
Judging from what I see at conferences and in print, we seem to be endorsing the former, 
despite the latter’s vastly larger eco-social impacts. 
The choice to frame our objects of study as new also carries political implications. Surely 
new phenomena require new strategies of opposition, yet old strategies clearly remain useful. 
For example, the rollout of biodiversity offsetting policy at the European Union (EU) level 
was halted by some very old school organizing: from counter-demonstrations to coalition 
building to pamphlets (Lave and Robertson, 2017).10 Taking the political implications of our 
work a bit further, I have to come think that those of us who study the rare aspects of 
‘neoliberal natures’ that may actually have a claim to novelty (the shiny labels on the old 
bottles) may be complicit in their reproduction. By continuing to heap academic attention on 
these relatively empty forms of market-based environmental management (bonds that are 
never issued, widely-touted markets with almost no transactions), we promote and legitimize 
the institutions we critique. I would thus argue that framing the phenomena we study as 
distinctively neoliberal is a mistake on both intellectual and political fronts. 
To be clear, I am not saying that neoliberalism is unimportant and everyone should just 
get over it. It is abundantly clear that the impacts of neoliberal policies and technologies on 
education, healthcare, and housing, among other areas, have been and continue to be 
profound. I am making a more specific argument: that neoliberalism is, relatively 
speaking, a non-event in the history of nature/capital. Nor am I arguing that our decade 
and a half of work on neoliberal natures was a waste of intellectual time and energy. Quite 
the contrary: it would have been impossible to understand just how little neo there is about 
neoliberal environmental conservation without the superb body of existing research. Instead, 
my point is that when we frame market-based environmental management as an important 
inflection point in the ongoing articulation of nature/capital, we invite intellectual and 
political consequences that are actively unhelpful in the intertwined struggles for social 
and environmental justice. 
 
Notes 
9. For example, in the introduction to their now classic Geoforum special issue on Neoliberal Natures, 
McCarthy and Prudham (2004) trace neoliberalism’s liberal roots, but they also refer to new social 
movements (278), new scalar dynamics (279), new risks leading to new social fractures (280), and 
new forms of discipline (280) associated with neoliberalism’s particular relationship to nature. 
Heynen and Robbins, in the introduction to their similarly germinal special issue of Capitalism 
Nature Socialism (2005), ‘The Neoliberalization Nature’, close the opening paragraph with the 
assertion that: ‘Today, neoliberal capitalism drives the politics, economics and culture of the world 
system, providing the context and direction for how humans affect and interact with non-human 
nature and with one another’ (p. 5). To my mind, however, quotes such as this are unnecessary to 
demonstrate that the ‘neoliberal natures’ literature is based on the assumption that there is 
something importantly different about this particular stage of capitalism: why else would so 
many of us having been referring to what we study as ‘neoliberal’ rather than simply as ‘capitalist’? 
10. See for example http://www.fern.org/sites/fern.org/files/Biodiversity1_EN.pdf, http://www.fern. 
org/sites/fern.org/files/Biodiversity2_EN.pdf, http://www.fern.org/sites/fern.org/files/ 
Biodiversity3_EN.pdf. The ‘duck’ on the cover of the third is particularly fine. 
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When I arrived at Ohio State in 2001, as a junior faculty member straight out of graduate 
school, I told my mentor Larry Brown that I had a series of articles planned on neoliberalism 
and nature. He told me this was a dead end, that neoliberalism was old news, done in the 
1980s. Thank goodness I didn’t listen. Instead, I was part of the wave of early scholarship 
addressing linkages between nature and free-market ideology and policy, and also part of the 
later wave of scholarship bringing specific attention to questions of health and the body. 
Recently I have been exploring parallels between emerging ideas about the body and the 
planet, in which nature is open, unbounded, and always socionatural. A key question for 
those of us interested in neoliberal natures is whether and in what ways these emerging 
conceptions of nature might facilitate, rather than undermine, capitalist accumulation and 
uneven development. 
The broad questions we were asking in those first few years were many, including how 
neoliberal economic policy affects environments and how neoliberal precepts were being 
taken up in environmental governance.11 The clearest threads of this scholarship were on 
enclosure of the resource commons, such as fisheries, forests and water. Addressing the 
interlinked processes of dispossession, commodification, marketization and privatization, 
this research addressed how such reforms were actually carried out, continuities with past 
enclosures, and their socioeconomic and environmental effects. 
For me, this work collectively made three interlinked claims that now seem simple but 
then – just 15 years ago – were new. First, the work on neoliberalism and nature focused 
extensively on the contradictions of neoliberalism, in particular helping to identify and 
elucidate the reregulatory side of market-based ‘deregulation’. Second, it is not just that 
neoliberalism affects environments and environmental governance, but that nature is central 
to neoliberalism, as to capitalism more broadly. As Heynen et al. put it, neoliberal 
‘ideologies and promises are in part compelled and constituted through our changing 
relationship to nature’ (2007: 12). Third, it is not that neoliberalism responds to and acts 
on external nature, but instead both neoliberalism itself and the natures on which it acts are 
socionatures. In a move that prefigures the more recent turn to ‘new materialism’, inquiry 
was about how the materiality of nature influenced the forms and outcomes (including 
failures) of neoliberal governance; see for example my work on fisheries, Karen Bakker’s 
work on water, and Morgan Robertson’s work on wetlands. Indeed, it was the inescapable 
materiality of neoliberalism that drove many of the contradictions that this work also 
identified. 
Given how resolutely material and socionatural this work was, it was surprising to me 
that the body was largely missing.12 Along with others, I started asking, why should our 
interest in socionatural materiality end at the skin? In a surge of interest in the body over the 
past decade, scholarship has addressed themes such as devolutionary public health, 
opportunities and challenges for biocapital, and how the materiality of the body both 
configures and is configured by particular neoliberal shifts.13 On the one hand, the initial 
focus on the body was also part and parcel with another shift: to integrate questions about 
neoliberal subjectivity in our inquiries into neoliberal political economy (Larner, 2003). 
Of particular interest was how devolutionary policy helped create – in fact required – the 
healthiest subject of self-care and responsibilization: not only is it our own responsibility, as 
individuals and families, to nurture the health of ourselves and our children, but we seem to 
take on this responsibility consensually, enforcing it in ourselves and others. For example, 
I analyzed how concerns about health risks of contaminated seafood in the US have led not 
to efforts to reduce pollution but to advisories to childbearing women about what to eat. 
Approaches such as this generate opportunities for capital accumulation not only through 
deregulation but as people seek more care (and tests, products, drugs, special foods etc) in 
their efforts to achieve health (Guthman and DuPuis, 2006). It also entrenches normative 
expectations and socioeconomic inequalities regarding individual efficacy, family structures 
and roles, and the ability access the means to health – not to mention regarding what health 
even means. 
On the other hand, I see this turn to the body in political ecology as linked to the new 
understanding of nature, both bodily and earthly, that is emerging across popular and 
intellectual thought, including in the sciences. Regarding the nature of the body, 
‘postgenomic’ sciences (such as epigenomics and microbiomics) increasingly figure bodies 
as open, malleable, responsive multiplicities (Guthman and Mansfield, 2013). This challenges 
the idea of the body as a fixed, closed, and sovereign entity that is walled off from 
environmental influences, including human actions. Against both gene/environment and 
human/nature dualisms, in this view bodies are fully imbricated with sociobiochemical 
environments that influence the action of genes and development of organisms. At the 
same time, something similar has happened with the proliferation of ‘Anthropocene’ as an 
optic for thinking about the planet.14 Earth and atmospheric sciences increasingly figure the 
planet, too, as open, malleable and responsive. Used to identify the present as the geologic 
age of humans (especially in reference to the planet-altering effects of hydrocarbon energy, 
materials, fertilizers, etc.) this challenges the idea of nature as an external and pristine entity, 
walled off from human action. This view challenges not only the human/nature dualism but 
also the biological/geological dualism, undermining divides between living and non-living. 
In other words, whether referencing the nature of the body or the nature the planet, the 
emerging scientific orthodoxy – the new truth – is that nature and humans are not separate 
but always intertwine. This view aligns rather well with the earlier work on neoliberal 
natures as well as with the previous decades of work in political ecology (and related 
fields). Aligning with ideas about socionatures and the like, this view not only 
acknowledges human influence in nature (e.g. endocrine disrupting chemicals, climate 
change), but is, thereby, anti-dualist in its approach to nature. 
And yet, what is so fascinating is that this anti-dualist view of unbounded, post-natural 
socionatures seems not to have undermined neoliberal deregulation, devolution and 
accumulation – as political ecologists expected and argued – but in many ways 
facilitates it (Mansfield, 2018).15 For one, the unbounded body and planet both seem 
more vulnerable and in need of care and protection. For another, the vulnerable, 
unbounded body and planet are also more open to intervention: health and well-being 
appear to be within our control, as long as we do all the right things. The end of pristine 
nature may raise anxiety about the future of life, but it also raises hope, particularly by 
authorizing intervention in natures both bodily and earthly to make them do what ‘we’ 
want. It is not just the promise of engineering that is friendly to capital, but also that this 
anti-dualist, post-natural view seems also to authorize adaptation rather than prevention. 
If environmental change is inevitable, then we need not prevent change, we need only find 
ways to adapt: build and buy the right products, technologies, medicines, and so forth. 
This is neoliberal self-care intensified: let potential harms proliferate while devolving 
responsibility for protection and even improvement to the individual family, and even 
as potential harms proliferate, the existence of actual harm is a sign of individual 
failure. In this version, unbounded anti-dualist nature is the embodiment of all-fetters 
off capitalism; in the latest fix to the contradictions of capitalism nature is endlessly 
produced in an ‘economy of repair’ (Fairhead et al., 2012: 242). 
If trends in postgenomic and Anthropocene thinking seem to further entrench neoliberal 
nature, what then are we to make of the mixed messages of the Trump era? In its first six 
months, the Trump administration famously challenged neoliberal free trade, pulling out of 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership, while also doubling down on neoliberal deregulation, 
particularly in the environmental arena – not only pulling out the Paris Climate 
Agreement but constantly assaulting the Environmental Protection Agency’s regulations, 
for example trying to weaken ozone and methane regulations and fast-track approval of new 
chemicals (the real effectiveness of these assaults remains to be seen). Clearly, Trump too is 
interested in all-fetters off capitalism – particularly though certainly not exclusively in fossil 
fuel industries. Yet he also seems more interested in sovereign power than the free-floating, 
let-things-happen power of liberalism. He is definitely interested in his own sovereign power! 
But as a corollary this also extends to nature, about which his administration is remarkably 
old-fashioned: nature both bodily and planetary is indeed a fortress, a separate entity, 
unaffected by human action; emissions do not affect the climate; environmental exposures 
do not affect biology. In this view we can use nature without harm – to nature or to 
ourselves. 
In other words, as those of us interested in neoliberalism and nature argued from the 
beginning, nature is at the heart of political economic debates. The approach of the Trump 
administration seems crisis prone at so many levels both economic and environmental. One 
of these levels may be clashes between fractions of capital at cross-purposes, divided by their 
material relation to nature. A sovereign fortress nature to dominate and use without worry? 
Or an unbounded socionature to dominate by continually engineering money-making 
adaptations for protection and improvement – while constantly trying to defer the 
responsibilities and downsides to (the most disadvantaged) individuals? 
My point, though, is not to ask about which sort of nature is better for facilitating capital 
through its inevitable crises. Rather, the point is to ask about what sorts of nature at what 
moments lead to what kinds of crisis – and for whom. In other words, highlighting problems 
with the emerging anti-dualist view of unbounded socionature is not a call to return to 
traditional, dualist views of fortress nature. Instead, it is a call to continue to attend to 
the very material politics of uneven development, of multiple axes of advantage and 
disadvantage affecting differential existence (both human and nonhuman). As political 
ecologists, we should not embrace one view of nature or another as inherently better. 
Rather than taking a determinist view, we must acknowledge, explore, and contest the 
power relations that inhere – though in different ways – in all configurations of nature. 
Notes 
11. See the 2004 special issue of Geoforum on ‘Neoliberal nature and the nature of neoliberalism’ and 
2005 special issue of Capitalism, Nature, Socialism on ‘Commodification of nature’, which were 
then collected in Heynen N, McCarthy J, Prudham S, et al. (2007) Neoliberal Environments: False 
Promises and Unnatural Consequences. London: Routledge, and also the 2007 special issue of 
Antipode republished as Mansfield B (2008) Privatization: Property and the Remaking of Nature- 
Society Relations. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
12. Long of interest in areas such as feminist geography or medical geography, until recently the body 
was not a central object of inquiry in geography more broadly, including in political ecology. 
13. See for example the 2012 special issue of the Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 
on ‘Geographies of health’. Signaling a renewed interest in health and the body, the issue covers a 
range of geographical approaches and themes; articles such as those by Brown et al., Guthman, 
Scott et al., Sultana, and me touch on the themes I mention here. 
14. See for example the 2015 special issue of the Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 
on ‘Futures: imagining socioecological transformation’, in which Anthropocene was a major 
theme. 
15. There already exists robust debate about some strands of this thinking, such as with regard to the 
‘ecomodernist manifesto’. (See Robbins P and Moore SA. (2015) Love your symptoms: A 
sympathetic diagnosis of the Ecomodernist Manifesto. Entitle Blog – A Collaborative Writing 
Project on Political Ecology.) My aim is not to critique specific strands of thought, but to turn 
the focus back on political ecology, raising questions about what it means to adopt anti-dualist 
ideas about unbounded natures. 
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 The commodification of nature is a central aspect and arena for analysis of neoliberal 
natures, which represents a set of environmental governance projects based on market 
logics and relations. The carbon market is one such project based on the commodification 
of carbon as a climate change mitigation strategy. Carbon markets, particularly in forest 
ecosystems, offer a revealing lens into the contradictions and politics of neoliberal natures. 
Scholars of the commodification of nature have explored various forms of resistance 
(McAfee and Shapiro, 2010; Wolford, 2005) – often drawing on Karl Polanyi’s concept of 
nature as a ‘fictitious commodity’ that undergoes ‘double movements’ of commodification 
and social regulation (Guthman, 2007; Prudham, 2005). Polanyi argued that because 
fictitious commodities such as land are deeply embedded in social, cultural and ecological 
values, subjugating nature to market logics unleashes protective countermovements that 
mitigate the destructive impacts of commodification (2001). However, insights from 
carbon markets in Indigenous communities point to a particular reading of Polanyi that 
advocates for a re-embedding of the economy not simply through market reform but the 
more radical de-commodification of land and nature (Lacher, 1999). In this intervention, 
I examine recent contestations and proposed alternatives to carbon markets in forests by 
Indigenous Peoples of the Amazon. I argue that the projects and processes of neoliberalizing 
nature produce not only a host of fallouts associated with them, but also produce a set of 
politics that are challenging the very foundations of capitalism. 
The carbon market is a quintessentially neoliberal strategy for addressing climate change 
because it rests on the quantification and trading of units of nature (in the form of carbon 
dioxide equivalents) through a variety of projects that offset emissions produced elsewhere. 
While initially celebrated in the 1990s as a cost-effective mechanism for reducing greenhouse 
gases under the Kyoto Protocol, carbon markets have since faced fierce criticism and 
resistance especially when applied in forest ecosystems (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008; 
White, 2011). Scholars of the commodification of carbon have identified a range of issues 
and concerns associated with neoliberal natures, including the problems of measurement and 
calculation (Lansing, 2010; Lohmann, 2005), questions of access and land control (Corbera 
and Brown, 2010; Lansing, 2014; Osborne, 2011), and equity broadly defined in the form of 
sustainable development and livelihood outcomes (Milne and Adams, 2012; Osborne, 2015). 
Although supporters claim that forest-based carbon markets generate a ‘development 
dividend’ for local communities (Forsyth, 2007), many projects have failed to deliver 
promised local livelihood benefits and have constrained access to land and forest 
resources (Beymer-Farris and Bassett, 2012; Osborne and Shapiro-Garza, 2017). The 
contradictions of carbon commodification are consistent with much of the scholarship on 
the neoliberalization of nature, which strongly suggests that while outcomes are certainly 
uneven, in most cases the benefits are skewed toward powerful elites leaving marginalized 
people more vulnerable (Heynen et al., 2007, McCarthy and Prudham, 2004). As with the 
commodification of other natures, the commodification of carbon has produced diverse 
forms of resistance in forest communities, that include appeals to the state, social 
mobilizations, as well as renewed claims to Indigenous land (Lohmann, 2010; McAfee 
and Shapiro, 2010). 
Carbon countermovements in forest communities are a response to contradictions or the 
failures of carbon markets to: (1) develop a robust and effective market, (2) address the main 
drivers of deforestation and (3) deliver adequate benefits to local communities without 
constraining land access. While the double-movement may take diverse forms in response 
to the failures of neoliberal natures, one manifestation in the Amazon is oriented around 
Indigenous territorial land rights as an alternative to market-based climate strategies in 
forests. 
Indigenous territorial claims as a response to REDD 
Neoliberal natures have largely failed to develop and sustain a robust market in forest 
carbon. Modeled on carbon offset projects in forests and Payments for Ecosystem 
Services (PES) programs, REDD is a financial mechanism that places economic value 
on the carbon sequestration and storage services forests provide. REDD is an initiative 
of the UN, proposed as a cost-effective strategy for climate change mitigation by reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation through sustainable forest 
management, conservation and the enhancement of carbon stocks in developing countries 
(Duchelle et al., 2014; Stern, 2006). However, of the $9.8 billion of aggregate pledges and 
investment for REDD, 90% has been derived through bilateral and multilateral public 
sources not carbon markets (Norman and Nakhooda, 2015). As REDD is currently 
excluded from compliance markets due to longstanding methodological concerns about 
credible carbon measurement, monitoring, and baseline setting, among other key issues, 
most REDD carbon credits are exchanged on voluntary markets. While in 2016, 
REDD represented the most highly transacted project type on the voluntary carbon 
market valued at $41.2 M, it was still dwarfed by massive public funding for climate 
change mitigation in forests (Hamrick and Gallant, 2017). This demonstrates the first 
failure of neoliberal natures to develop and sustain a robust and therefore effective 
carbon market in forests. The result has been low carbon pricing and therefore limited 
socioeconomic benefits for carbon producers. 
The second failure of neoliberal natures is the inability of carbon markets to successfully 
target the drivers of deforestation (Osborne et al., 2014). There is a certain irony that 
Indigenous communities of the Amazon with relatively low carbon footprints are being 
enrolled in strategies to solve a problem driven by fossil fuel combustion elsewhere. As 
the low and volatile prices of the carbon market are unable to compete with the 
opportunity costs of deforestation drivers linked to the commodification of other natures 
with more established markets – such as cattle ranching, soybean and oil palm production – 
indigenous lands, which are often dedicated to subsistence needs and therefore viewed as 
having low or negligible market value, have been a target for REDD initiatives. 
The third failure of neoliberal natures in forests relates to the ways in which carbon 
commodification can effectively enclose the land and forest resources of marginalized 
communities through the occupation of arable lands with project trees. One of the main 
concerns among Indigenous Peoples with regards to REDD is exclusion from forests and/ 
or restrictions of resource access, which some communities have experienced in the wake of 
earlier carbon and conservation efforts (Osborne et al., 2014; Pokorny et al., 2013; Sunderlin 
et al., 2014). This issue is particularly salient in contexts where Indigenous Peoples lack 
formal land rights or where land tenure is uncertain, conditions under which some 
REDD pilot projects have been already inserted. While advocates argue the clarification 
of territorial rights can be instrumental in protecting Indigenous Peoples’ sovereign rights 
and help resolve competing land use claims, property titles can also make access more 
precarious (Pokorny et al., 2013; Sunderlin et al., 2014). In addition, informal forest users 
have become marginalized in the tenure process as rights are clarified for others (Osborne, 
2013). Land rights, therefore, remain an area of significant concern for Indigenous Peoples 
with regards to REDD (Schroeder, 2010; Thompson et al., 2011). 
Indigenous responses to REDD have been diverse, ranging from negotiated 
participation as in the case of the Surui Indigenous community in Brazil, to complete 
opposition to the initiative in all its forms – market or non-market – as advocated by the 
Indigenous Environmental Network (Goldtooth, 2010). A more recently articulated 
response to the failure of carbon markets in forests has been the call for territorial rights 
before the implementation of REDD – ‘No rights, no REDD’ or as an alternative to 
REDD altogether. For example, some Indigenous Peoples of the Amazon have 
challenged REDD on its own terms by demonstrating that Indigenous territories store 
significant amounts of carbon, are highly biodiverse, and less costly to manage compared to 
existing REDD projects. Recognizing the targeting of Indigenous lands for climate change 
mitigation strategies, leaders of the Indigenous Amazonian federation COICA approached 
researchers of the Woods Hole Research Center to conduct an analysis of carbon storage 
within Indigenous territories and protected natural areas (Walker et al., 2015). The 
study found that Indigenous Peoples of the Amazon played an important role in forest 
stewardship, and that their territories are associated with low levels of deforestation and 
are responsible for storing nearly one third of the region’s aboveground carbon (Walker 
et al., 2015). Based on this research, COICA is in the process of developing an Indigenous 
REDD program (COICA, 2013). Territorial rights for Indigenous communities, as 
articulated by COICA, represent conservation strategies based on the de-commodification 
of land, and has emerged as a mechanism to reclaim forests from state governments. 
Indigenous territorial claims as a response to carbon commodification brings into sharp 
relief the longstanding history of land dispossession and the ongoing struggle to reclaim 
Indigenous lands (Escobar, 1998). In this way, the neoliberalization of nature is more than 
the contemporary set of projects and processes of environmental governance based on 
market logics and relations associated with neoliberalism. It is also and importantly 
linked to a longer history of agrarian capitalism. Therefore, neoliberal natures must 
consider a longer history of land dispossession as it informs the character of and locus of 
struggle: Indigenous territory. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the solution might lie 
beyond Keynesianism and market reform but involve a more radical de-commodification 
of land, labor and money. 
In conclusion, this work contributes to previous scholarship on resistance to nature’s 
commodification by focusing on Indigenous countermovements in the context of climate 
change. It demonstrates that embeddedness is not simply reflective of state-based 
protections, regulations and reforms, but articulated with cultural politics around territory 
and a more radical project of de-commodifying nature in line with indigenous sovereignty 
and cosmo-visions (Escobar, 1998; Lacher, 1999). Furthermore, territorial land rights for 
Indigenous Peoples in the Amazon have the potential to keep fossil fuels underground, 
thereby constraining the engine of capital, which can make way for alternative and more 
equitable approaches to climate change mitigation through Indigenous REDD. As a broader 
defense of life beyond carbon, Indigenous approaches to REDD as described here, provide 
alternative anti-capitalist worldviews that could transform the climate mitigation landscape 
in more effective and socially just ways. 
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For many geographers, the publication of Neoliberal Environments, along with work near the 
same time by Smith (2007), Mansfield (2008) and Castree (2008a, 2008b), was a landmark 
moment in the study of the relationship between neoliberal capitalism and the environment. 
These works were, I suggest, the close of the first act – the moment when all the principals 
(and principles) are on stage and a summative aria is sung laying out the main threads that 
will structure the story going forward. The prehistory of ‘neoliberal natures’ is rooted, for 
most geographers, in the debates over nature within eco-Marxism in the late 1980s and early 
1990s (e.g. Altvater, 1993; Benton, 1989) – centering around James O’Connor’s (e.g. 1994) 
key idea of the ‘second contradiction of capitalism’ and related questions over whether or 
not ‘nature’ (abstractly conceived) formed a barrier to capitalist accumulation or an essential 
‘fictitious commodity’. Castree’s (1995) article in Antipode provides the best statement of the 
state of the field that led to the emergence of a concept of ‘neoliberal natures’, which I would 
pin to McAfee’s (1999) paper on the commodification of genetic information entitled ‘Selling 
nature to save it’. The key to her formulation was a detailed grappling with biology 
and ecology in a way that didn’t focus on issues of materiality. Instead, with a grounded and 
ethnographic instinct, she chose to view nature as capitalists were increasingly doing: as an 
informational or service commodity rather than a stock of material objects. 
McAfee helped us bid farewell to the long debate over whether or not nature’s resistance 
to capital was in its ontological materiality. Going forward, talk of ‘nature’ would no longer 
do: nature writ large was not an analytic topic legible in the study of neoliberal capitalism. 
Genes were. Water, fish, wetlands, ecosystem services. These were the objects that were being 
made to circulate and bear value, and as geographers we had to be just as specific about the 
measurement and epistemology of the thing as capitalists were. No more the chasing down 
of capitalist nature from the lofty starting point of underproduction/overproduction 
debates; rather, Castree (1995: 25) urged us towards specificity: ‘take nature seriously as a 
material entity and actor in history, without hypostatizing it as a fixed, unchangeable, 
universal given separate from society’. This is a warning few of us need today, but 
Castree was showing the way forward at the time. 
It is this groundedness that marked the novelty in this approach to capitalist nature from 
a Marxist perspective. Capital is not so powerful as to commodify everything with its touch, 
nor is nature so powerful as to resist capital through its material weight. Rather, McAfee’s 
paper showed the ongoing and contingent process by which nature becomes, or does not 
become, capable of bearing value and taking the commodity form, an abstraction from 
something ‘irreducibly complex’. While much of the early work on neoliberal natures 
dealt with the process of commodifying nature, this gross process was subdivided into 
subsumption, privatization, valuation and governance. Foreshadowing future 
developments in the literature, McAfee’s main analytic focus was the world of global 
environmental policy and venues of governance rather than the realm of agricultural or 
industrial production that had dominated earlier discussions in green Marxism. The paper 
also forged then-novel methodological links with STS by holding equivalent the 
microtechniques of both finance and genomics that were required to distill the value of 
genes. 
These are all elements that seem unremarkable now, even requisite. But to understand 
how the concern for neoliberal natures has taken the form it has, one has to see what it took 
shape against. Green and eco-Marxists circa 1990 wanted a way to talk about a nature that 
was spatially and temporally complex, and not simply read off of the logic of capital or 
conceived of as an inanimate surface on which capital played out. But they did so at a level 
of abstraction that was very high. Elmar Altvater, surely one of the most brilliant eco- 
Marxists, did not go further than to indicate that nature’s complexity posed a problem 
for capital logic: ‘The heterogeneity of physical transformation in real space and time – 
that is, the particularity of materials, place, and ecology – is at odds with the axiom of 
general comparability in the world marketplace imposed by capitalism’ (1993: 79). His point 
made, he hands the baton off to ecologists, whose business it is to document that 
heterogeneity. 
The explosion of work in economic geography on neoliberalism and the crisis tendencies 
of late capitalism in the 1980s and 1990s had exerted a strong gravitational pull on most of 
human geography and the writers on neoliberal nature were no exception. Reading Altvater 
or Benton or Redclift on nature was somewhat unsatisfying if one had just come from 
reading a close and grounded examination of innovation amongst small fashion houses in 
Emilia-Romagna, or amongst high-tech firms on Boston’s Route 128. One wanted to be in a 
position to both see the world of global capital and pursue and document its heterogeneity 
and contingency, as the economic geographers were doing. The bibliographies of the early 
writers on neoliberal natures are larded with the textured ethnographic approach of Michael 
Burawoy, and equally the post-structural concern for situatedness of Gill Valentine and 
Audrey Kobayashi. The incompleteness of capitalism and its aporetic spaces, following 
Gibson-Graham (1993) were at least as important as the grinding power of capital to 
remake nature in its own image, following O’Connor (1994) and a common misreading of 
Smith’s (1985) ‘second nature’. 
Soon there were enough people working in this vein that ‘neoliberal natures’ became a 
thing – AAG sessions had been organized around the term starting around 2002, and Cori 
Hayden had used the term as the title of part one of her excellent book on bioprospecting in 
Mexico (2003). James McCarthy and Scott Prudham organized a special section of 
Geoforum in 2004, ‘Neoliberal nature and the nature of neoliberalism’, and of the Geoforum 
authors only two would be missing from Neoliberal Environments. Likewise, the book 
featured all but one of the authors in Becky Mansfield’s (2008) special issue of Antipode 
on the privatization of nature (see Mansfield, 2008). 
So on the one hand, we have a relatively coherent group of people who had been 
publishing in the same venues for a few years and influencing each others’ work. On the 
other hand, these authors came from very different places. Many were pivotal in earlier work 
in political ecology (Peluso, Rocheleau, Swyngedouw, Robbins, Watts). Others were rooted 
strongly in economic geography (Brenner, Larner, Bridge, Theodore). There were 
geographers who we might identify primarily as historical, urban or feminist. Some 
approached the problem of nature as a ‘Volume 1 Marxist’, focusing on the 
commodification process and the constitution of value, and others approached the 
problem as a ‘Volume 2 Marxist’, focusing on production and its structuring effects on 
the environment.16 The former could be accused of seeing commodities without 
production and without realization, which threatens to drift into a kind of post-Marxist 
anthropology of commodities (a` la Appadurai), untethered to the rigors of creating surplus 
value. One can see this in my own work on wetlands (e.g. Robertson, 2004). The latter could 
be accused of trying to make the hidden abode of nature’s production look too much like a 
Manchester factory as it becomes the vehicle for crises of state or labor. I can see this in the 
earlier work of Prudham and McCarthy in their Geoforum special issue. Some wrote with a 
commitment to nature as (in an oft-repeated phrase) ‘simultaneously material and 
discursive’, while others saw the material/discursive binarism as the thing to be 
demolished (cf. Bakker and Bridge’s, 2006 overview). 
‘Neoliberal natures’, then, was not the answer to a single question, but rather something 
articulated by a range of geographers seeking to incorporate sophisticated, grounded and 
ecologically literate accounts of nature into their observations of the varied projects of late 
capitalism. They knew what they didn’t like, and it was the gestural treatment of nature, 
unspecified and monolithic, in the study of the governance or expansion of market relations 
in late capitalism. This is understandable, from a generational perspective: such a concept, 
for many, had been the nemesis against which they sparred in graduate seminars at the 
beginning of their careers. 
What they also shared was the use of field-based case studies. Castree in 2008 weighed in 
on the limits of this, essentially saying that the pendulum had swung too far from 1995 and 
we had perhaps listened to him a little too well that ‘much more attention has to be given to 
understanding the proximate (produced) natural processes at work in environmental 
degradation, in addition to the distal social-structural causes which Marxist analysis has 
traditionally been concerned with’ (1995: 26, emphasis in original). By 2008, 
‘there is a danger that diverse investigations of nature’s neoliberalization (in the plural) 
will obscure the common ‘logics’ and processes operating within or between otherwise 
different spatiotemporal settings’ (Castree, 2008a: 137). 
To vastly oversimplify, the development of neoliberal natures work from 1990 to 2007 is 
this: the study of nature under late capitalism had abounded in theoretical debates, but 
lacked case studies and biophysical literacy. The latter were then vigorously pursued, but 
perhaps at the expense of the former. As other essays in this forum will detail, much has 
changed in the past 10 years. The coherence of the concept of neoliberalism has been 
challenged (Brenner et al., 2010) – though in a way which, I believe, enriches the 
neoliberal natures approach rather than undermines it. The Volume 1/Volume 2 dyad has 
been augmented with a focus on the state and governance, noncapitalisms, finance and the 
concern for the reproduction of capital. At a stroke, Felli (2014) nearly banished the entire 
debate over the commodification and production of nature as it had unfolded since 1999, 
pointing out that the prices assigned to things like ecosystem services and wetland permits 
are much more legible as forms of rent. For twenty years we whistled past the question of 
where surplus value might come from if nature is produced – can nature be exploited in the 
same way as labor? Analogies can be made between ecological and labor inputs to 
production, to be sure, but where is the surplus value in the labor that creates a carbon 
credit? Or, how is nature alienated from the product of its own labor? How might this 
exploitation, rather than an exhaustion of stocks, create a crisis tendency analogous to 
the exploitation of labor? It doesn’t really work. Felli stands alongside the largely honored- 
in-the-breach Chapter 11 of Harvey’s Limits to Capital, and Guthman’s (2002) 
argument on rent, at which most of us nodded at and made a note to re-read Harvey. 
Especially in the process and service commodities with which a good deal of work on 
neoliberal natures is concerned, most of what is capitalized about nature can be 
considered a rent imposed on inputs that is established by the state. Value in the strictly 
Marxian sense is thus created without having to fit nature into the labor-sized hole in 
capitalism, requiring it to be a commodity, or abandoning the idea that nature is a social 
abstraction creating crisis tendencies. 
In two decades, the tension over the under-specification of nature in capitalism has played 
itself out, but given rise to other tensions and further acts. Neoliberal natures does not mean 
what it meant in 1999 or 2007, but it continues to be a durable rubric under which to bring 
together our changing understanding of accumulation and governance in a capitalist society 
and our changing understanding of ecological relations. 
 
Note 
16. I am indebted to Paul Robbins for this observation. 
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In this intervention, I introduce two concepts – stealth unknown–knowns and disingenuous 
nature to animate and clarify key research and policy developments at the nexus of 
environmental governance, neoliberalism and environmental change. I use these concepts 
to (a) briefly distill important insights from geographers, political ecologists and other 
critical scholars of the environment who have explored neoliberalism as an interrelated 
‘set of coherent ideologies, discourses, and material practices’ (McCarthy and Prudham, 
2004: 276) and to (b) illuminate the complex and power-laden nature of knowledge 
production and management under an increasingly hegemonic neoliberal environmental 
governance doctrine. I argue that critical engagement with each concept is important for 
evaluating the construction and implications of environmental knowledge claims made by 
powerful market actors that ultimately shape how we come to understand and manage 
environmental change in diverse settings. 
 
Neoliberal sensibilities as stealth unknown–knowns 
Stealth unknown–knowns pertain to the tacit ideas and beliefs that inform our interpretation 
of the world, and that may influence efforts to privilege or disavow certain information 
within environmental management contexts. These ideas and logic frames linger outside 
of our conscious awareness yet are always active, exertive and at play. They structure our 
understanding of the world without us readily acknowledging their influence. Unknown– 
knowns are the suppositions and beliefs, as Zizek notes, ‘we pretend not to know about, even 
though they form the background of our public values’ (2004, 1). He continues, ‘they are the 
things we don’t know that we know-which is precisely, the Freudian unconscious, the 
‘‘knowledge which doesn’t know itself,’’ as Lacan used to say’. 
For political ecologists, neoliberal stealth unknown–knowns and their furtive influence are 
best characterized as underlying capitalist and market-based values and belief systems that 
privilege nature’s enclosure, efficient use, private sector management, market 
commensurable valuation, techno-centric treatment and profit maximizing potential. Over 
the past several decades these values have soaked into the core fabric of mainstream 
environmental governance. The now engrained nature of neoliberal sensibilities has 
steadily increased, marking a transition from overt market triumphalism (Peet and Watts, 
1993) to more mundane and standardized applications where capitalist logic and governance 
operates implicitly as assumed best practice (Goldman, 2006) – including programs targeting 
sustainable forestry, energy conservation and climate change mitigation (see below). 
And although they are underlying and typically non-controversial viewpoints, they are 
also profoundly influential as they circumscribe what knowledge and practices are possible. 
Stealth neoliberal logic within development practice is therefore important to reveal because 
its enactment by market actors arises oftentimes at the exclusion of other affected 
development subjects. Neoliberal sensibilities are thus stealthy not because they are 
performed in intentionally covert ways, but rather because they are achieved, oftentimes 
without hindrance, through hegemonic and taken-for-granted practices. 
 
The production of disingenuous natures 
This brand of surreptitious rationality is not without consequence for environmental 
governance. As the brief example from India below suggests, the application of neoliberal 
ideologies and beliefs oftentimes undergirds the production of faulty information in order to 
justify capitalist interventions. In an effort to make nature legible to the market, this process 
leads ultimately to the creation of ‘disingenuous natures’ that are understood and managed 
seemingly without controversy. Disingenuous natures are the management interventions and 
coinciding social-ecological conditions that emerge from faulty science, partial data and 
erroneous environmental narratives. They are disingenuous because – despite being 
constructed by surreptitious knowledge – they are understood and managed as if they 
were a legitimate, authentic and thus genuine depiction of social-ecological conditions 
(Simon, 2010). Acknowledging the disingenuous nature of certain environmental beliefs 
and imaginaries follows insights by Ferguson (1990) and Goldman (2006) who each note 
how particular representations of social-ecological ‘realities’ are useful to powerful entities 
not in their veracity or ability to effectively address pressing issues, but rather for their 
capacity to advance – through ‘green science’ at the World Bank for example (ibid) – the 
development agendas of State-led and market based development actors. 
Unsurprisingly, when observed through a neoliberal looking glass, our view of 
environmental problems leads us to see market compatible answers. This means defining 
problems and solutions that are commensurate – indeed optimally aligned – with the 
commodification, marketization and financialization of nature. Here, market entities 
construct a series of socio-environmental ‘ends’ that necessitate a set of neoliberal policy 
and management ‘means’. For example, Thompson et al. (2011) note that programs such 
as REDD provide ‘a particular framing of the problem of climate change and its 
solutions that validates and legitimizes specific tools, actors and solutions while 
marginalizing others’. Ultimately this process of neoliberal shoehorning may lead, as 
Forsyth (2002) suggests, to ‘land-use policies that have either simplified the underlying 
biophysical causes of apparent problems, or even imposed restrictions on the livelihoods 
of local people’ (p. 50). 
My own research in Andhra Pradesh, India provides a nice illustration of this process. 
Here, carbon market investors are using tens of thousands of improved cookstoves to 
mitigate (supposedly) household-driven deforestation from fuelwood collection activities. 
This long-standing narrative and disingenuous nature articulating ‘backwards’ forest 
communities as a threat to forest health was first espoused by colonial foresters as a 
scapegoating tactic to obfuscate their own extensive timber extraction activities. It was 
later utilized as a paternalistic management strategy by state forest agencies in order to 
create a series of local ecological exigencies that only well-resourced and authoritative 
bodies, such as the Indian Forest Service, would be able to manage (Sivaramakrishnan, 
1999). For more than a century now this fictional forest disappearing at the hands 
of irresponsible households has proven to be an administratively convenient problem 
frame. 
Today, market investors are repurposing this forest fiction, arguing that if ‘irresponsible’ 
households are driving deforestation due to woodfuel collection, then providing stoves that 
use less wood should curb rates of forest loss and, as a consequence, increase forest carbon 
sequestration potential (Simon et al., 2012). In rural India, this has become a convenient 
problem narrative precisely because it serves the offset requirements of the first-world driven 
carbon market, thus representing a neoliberal strategy described by Bumpus and Liverman 
(2008) as ‘accumulation by decarbonization’. 
In this contemporary context, the problem of household driven deforestation is a 
disingenuous nature devised administratively by the Fair Climate Network with technical 
assistance from the Indian Institute of Science; substantiated empirically using Gold 
Standard carbon monitoring methodologies under the Clean Development Mechanism; 
financed by international corporations and faith based organizations aiming to fulfill 
corporate social responsibility obligations; and legitimated discursively by the Global 
Alliance for Clean Cookstoves (a subset of the United Nations Foundation) tasked with 
educating the public and investors alike about the social and ecological virtues of clean 
cookstoves. As this vast network of actors suggests, this is a decidedly first-world problem 
at variance with more localized environmental accounts. Local forest users are not causing 
widespread forest loss. A long history of commercial forestry, urban and agricultural 
expansion, and many decades of logging under the British Raj suggest a decidedly different 
forest story. But for global carbon markets, and in order to manufacture a carbon market 
compatible problem, local forest loss must necessarily be driven by stove user forest demands. 
This brief case illustrates how explanations of contemporary environmental degradation in 
India, and the multi-scale carbon market constructed to manage it, are informed by a taken for- 
granted and hegemonic (read: stealth unknown-known) neoliberal sensibility resulting in 
de facto ‘best management practices’ (read: disingenuous nature) that foreclose other ways of 
understanding or responding to such landscape changes. 
 
Insights from critical scholars of the environment 
This type of disingenuousness is certainly not new. Examples abound throughout history 
where ‘reifications. . .create actual ‘‘permanances’’ in the social and material world around 
us’ (Harvey, 1996: 81). The notion of ‘permanances’, refers to regulatory, planning and 
material instantiations that are durable and that reinforce and deepen our acceptance of 
the ‘reifications’ over time; a process normalizing erroneous knowledge and reproducing 
public acceptance of, in this context, market-centric explanations of environmental change. 
The concept of disingenuous nature reflects findings from other scholars who have 
underscored the way powerful interests committed to neoliberal tenets may generate 
incomplete and distorted, yet seemingly credible and enduring depictions of socialecological 
systems. For example, scholars have demonstrated how recent efforts to chart 
‘sustainable’ and ‘green’ transitions are imbued with capitalist overtones, including 
initiatives like the millennium development goals (MDGs) (Sheppard and Leitner, 2010) 
and post-MDG programs (Kumi et al., 2014). Researchers have also assessed specific 
market-based strategies like payments for ecosystem services (McAfee and Shapiro, 2010), 
reducing emissions for deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) (Osborne, 2015) and 
carbon offset markets (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008), to name but a few. Here, investigators 
have demonstrated how engrained and institutionalized neoliberal sensibilities lead us to 
manage disingenuous environments in a manner that reflects market compatibility, resource 
efficiencies and profit maximization priorities over other more democratic, intrinsic and ecocentric 
concerns. 
Unsurprisingly, this privileging of certain environmental problems/histories and 
solutions/futures leads to ‘widely known definitions and explanations of environmental 
degradation are, in actuality, uncertain, highly contested, and misleading’ (Forsyth, 2003: 
25). These misalignments, labeled elsewhere as ‘maladaptation’ or ‘malmitigation’ (Marino 
and Ribot, 2012), connote situations or ‘fictions’ (Peet and Watts, 2002: 26) (i.e., 
disingenuous natures) where landscapes are managed and maintained in ways that are 
compatible with market solutions but not necessarily the needs of effected communities. 
The concept of disingenuous nature therefore acknowledges a dissonance between 
intrinsic/use and exchange/market values of nature. Smith (1984), identifying these two 
modalities as first and second nature respectively, notes that ‘the same piece of matter 
exists simultaneously in both natures; as physical commodity subject to the laws of 
gravity and physics it exists in the first nature, but as exchange-value subject to the laws 
of the market, it travels in the second nature’ (p. 79). Political ecologists and others have 
shown how de facto ‘second nature’ capitalist values lead institutions to manage socialecological 
conditions as ‘fictitious commodities’ (Polanyi, 1944) that do not reflect other 
intrinsic meanings – including those held nearby human and non-human actors. 
To some, these incongruences suggest that neoliberal environmental policies are 
fundamentally ill equipped to bring about just and equitable social-ecological changes 
(Klein, 2015). This is because market-based pathways offer a set of solutions that emanate 
from an ideational space and policy context that is internal to the problem; an imaginary of 
‘capitalism as the solution to, rather than progenitor of, uneven development’ (Sheppard and 
Leitner, 2010: 185). 
 
Reclaiming environmental governance, excavating disingenuous 
natures 
Critical engagement with neoliberal stealth unknown-knowns and disingenuous natures is as 
important as ever. As Castree (2013) suggests, throughout history nature has been ‘made 
sense of’ both ‘by us and to us’ (p. 6). And in this contemporary ‘post truth’ policy 
environment – riddled with entrenched filter bubbles, and knowledge silos, and a dizzying 
barrage of alternative and redacted environmental information – evaluating the construction 
and implications of environmental knowledge claims made ‘to us’ is particularly urgent 
(Lubchenco, 2017). This is especially the case with ingrained neoliberal ideologies, which 
have a surreptitious influence on environmental governance that reinforces its legitimacy 
while obviating other ways of knowing and managing nature. 
Indeed, as Lave (2015) and others have highlighted, the past several years has witnessed ‘a 
deep shift in the character and organization’ (p. 245) of control over the production of 
environmental expertise towards those in powerful positions. Given these developments, 
critical environmental researchers must assist diverse citizens, scientists and institutions to 
recover and redistribute environmental science, management and policy authority in more 
progressive, just and diverse directions. This goal will be achieved, in part, by slowing the 
spread of disingenuous natures – that is, by excavating knowledge distortions and biased 
information while also grappling with the local exigencies they produce. 
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